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Note 
 
 
 
SCHULTZ v. BANK OF AMERICA: A FLY IN THE FINANCIAL 
BUTTERMILK—CLARIFYING THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE 
EXCEPTION TO IMPROVE LITIGATION EFFICIENCY AND 
BANK SAFETY 
Lauren M. Elfner∗
In Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A.,
 
1 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland considered whether expert testimony was required to determine 
the standard of care owed by a bank when adding a customer to an 
account.2  The court held that expert testimony was necessary to establish 
the applicable standard of care3 because adding a customer’s name to an 
account involves internal bank procedures of which a trier of fact has only 
minimal understanding.4  In so holding, the court mischaracterized the 
procedure as complex and opaque5 and failed to appropriately define the 
common knowledge exception,6 thereby improperly placing the burden of 
loss on plaintiffs7 rather than on defendant banks capable of investing in 
innovative security technology.8
 
Copyright © 2011 by Lauren M. Elfner. 
  The Schultz court should have instead 
adopted a clear test for the common knowledge exception that would not 
∗ Lauren M. Elfner is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law, 
where she is a staff member of the Maryland Law Review.  The author would like to extend 
special thanks to Professor Donald Gifford for his guidance in thesis development and to the 
editorial board of the Maryland Law Review for their insight and feedback.  She would also like to 
thank Margaret Elfner and her family for giving her so many opportunities and endless support.   
 1. 413 Md. 15, 990 A.2d 1078 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 27, 990 A.2d at 1085. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id., 990 A.2d at 1085–86. 
 5. See infra Part IV.A. 
 6. See infra Part IV.B.  The common knowledge exception generally holds that expert 
testimony is only required where the inference at issue “‘is so particularly related to some science 
or profession that it is beyond the ken of the average layman.’”  Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. 
v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs. Ltd., 109 Md. App. 217, 257, 674 A.2d 106, 125 (1996) (quoting Virgil 
v. “Kash N’ Karry” Serv. Corp., 61 Md. App. 23, 31, 484 A.2d 652, 656 (1984)), aff’d, 346 Md. 
122, 695 A.2d 153 (1997).  If the matter is one that jurors would be familiar with by virtue of 
general knowledge, expert testimony is not required.  Id., 674 A.2d 125–26 (citing Babylon v. 
Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 307, 138 A.2d 375, 379 (1958)).  For a more detailed explanation of the 
common knowledge exception, see infra Part II.B.3. 
 7. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 8. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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only have provided prospective plaintiffs with guidance but also would 
have offered banks an incentive to establish a market for bank safety.9
I.  THE CASE 
  
Eighty-one year old Melvin Ray Schultz (“Schultz”) passed away on 
July 5, 2005 due to declining health and heavy drinking.10  Prior to his 
death, caregiver Robin Holbrook moved into Schultz’s home and had her 
name added to his Bank of America checking account.11  She then made 
multiple withdrawals.12  Indeed, the evidence suggested that Holbrook may 
have continued to make withdrawals in the days following Schultz’s 
death.13  On July 11, 2005, Stephen Schultz’s (“Stephen”) then-attorney 
delivered a temporary restraining order that directed Bank of America 
(“Bank”) to freeze Schultz’s account.14  According to Stephen, the Bank’s 
branch manager told the attorney that he had frozen the account on this 
date, but a letter from the Bank confirming the order was dated July 13, 
2005, two days after the attorney delivered the order.15  Subsequently, 
Stephen, as personal representative of his father’s estate, filed suit against 
the Bank in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, alleging breach of 
contract and negligent handling of Schultz’s account.16
At trial, Stephen presented three witnesses, including a handwriting 
expert, a friend of Schultz’s, and Stephen’s former attorney.
  
17
 
 9. See infra Part IV.C.  Bank safety refers to “financial institutions’ resistance to fraud 
against its customers.”  Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Towards a Market for Bank Safety, 21 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 155, 156 (2008). 
  The 
handwriting expert compared the signature appearing on the signature card 
 10. Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A., 413 Md. 15, 19–21, 990 A.2d 1078, 1081 (2010).   
 11. Id. at 20–21, 990 A.2d at 1081–82.   
 12. Id.  There is some factual dispute regarding how Holbrook had her name added to 
Schultz’s account.  Stephen Schultz, Schultz’s son and the petitioner in this case, alleged that 
Holbrook took advantage of his father in having her name added to Schultz’s account, either 
through coercion or forgery.  Id. at 18, 21, 990 A.2d at 1080, 1082.  A branch manager, whose 
deposition was entered into the record at trial, claimed that both Schultz and Holbrook were 
present when Holbrook’s name was added to the account.  Id. at 23–24, 990 A.2d at 1083. 
 13. Id. at 21–22 & n.4, 990 A.2d at 1082 & n.4 (suggesting that Stephen Schultz made this 
argument based on several transactions that posted to Schultz’s account following his death).  
 14. Id. at 18, 21–22, 990 A.2d at 1080, 1082. Stephen later testified that he had initially 
attempted to freeze the account both the day of and the day following his father’s death, in person 
and over the phone, to no avail.  Id. at 23, 990 A.2d at 1083. 
 15. Id. at 22 & n.3, 990 A.2d at 1082 & n.3.  Bank records demonstrate that the Bank 
“posted” withdrawals from Schultz’s account on July 12, 2005, but the line items for the 
withdrawals actually suggest that the Bank disbursed the funds prior to that date.  Id. at 22 n.4, 
990 A.2d at 1082 n.4. 
 16. Id. at 18–20, 990 A.2d at 1080.  
 17. Id. at 21, 990 A.2d at 1082.  Stephen did not, however, present any testimony regarding a 
bank’s standard of care when it adds an individual’s name to an existing customer’s account.  Id. 
at 23, 990 A.2d at 1083. 
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used to add Holbrook’s name to the account with several of Schultz’s 
known signatures and concluded that Schultz’s signature on the signature 
card did not match the other signatures against which it was analyzed.18  
Stephen also took the stand and pointed out uncharacteristic ATM activity 
and inauthentic signatures on checks drawn from Schultz’s account.19  
Additionally, in his briefs to the court, Stephen identified several 
discrepancies in the signature card itself: Schultz’s social security number 
was electronically printed, while Holbrook’s was handwritten;20 the 
signatures were transposed;21 and the card was printed from a personal 
computer rather than a bank-generated document.22  Following the Bank’s 
unsuccessful motion for judgment, the Bank and Stephen both read portions 
of the Bank manager’s deposition into evidence, which stated that both 
Schultz and Holbrook were present to add Holbrook’s name to Schultz’s 
account and described the procedures by which the manager verified their 
identities and signatures.23  The jury found in favor of Schultz on both his 
negligence and breach of contract claims.24
The Bank appealed the jury verdict, and the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals reversed on both counts, emphasizing that the negligence claim 
failed due to Stephen’s failure to provide expert testimony that established 
the Bank’s standard of care.
 
25
 
 18. Id. at 21, 990 A.2d at 1082.  Stephen’s other two witnesses presented testimony on 
Schultz’s declining health in the period leading to his death, as well as the temporary restraining 
order that Stephen’s former attorney had delivered to the Bank.  Id.  
  In reaching this conclusion, the intermediate 
appellate court declined to presume that a bank’s standard of care and 
internal procedures for adding a name to an account fell within a lay juror’s 
 19. Id. at 23, 990 A.2d at 1083.  Stephen admitted, however, that he did not know if his father 
wanted Holbrook to have any of the money in the account.  Id. 
 20. Id. at 24 n.5, 990 A.2d at 1083 n.5.  
 21. Id.  That is, Schultz’s signature appeared next to Holbrook’s social security number, while 
Holbrook’s signature appeared next to Schultz’s social security number.  Id.  
 22. Id.; id. at 44, 990 A.2d at 1096 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. at 23–24, 990 A.2d at 1083 (majority opinion).  The parties read the manager’s 
deposition into evidence because he was unavailable to testify at trial.  Id. at 23, 990 A.2d at 1083.  
Stephen claimed that, due to inconsistencies in handwriting and signature placement, the signature 
card itself contradicted this testimony.  Id. at 24 n.5, 990 A.2d at 1083 n.5.  
  After the presentation of this testimony, the Bank renewed its motion for judgment, 
arguing, among other things, that Stephen “had failed to prove the standard of care for his 
negligence claim because he had not produced expert testimony establishing the Bank’s duty to 
Schultz.”  Id. at 24, 990 A.2d at 1083–84.  The trial court denied the motion after concluding, as to 
this argument, that expert testimony was unnecessary to establish the standard of care on the facts 
of this case.”  Id. at 24–25, 990 A.2d at 1084. 
 24. Id. at 26, 990 A.2d at 1085.  The jury awarded Stephen $23,475 for the breach of contract 
claim and $7,600 for the negligence claim, for a total of $31,075.  Id.  
 25. Id.  The court also found that Stephen failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his 
breach of contract claim.  Id. 
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knowledge.26  The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to 
determine whether an expert opinion is necessary to establish the standard 
of care for a bank when adding a customer to an account.27
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
Maryland law imposes upon banks a duty of reasonable care toward 
their customers, both as a matter of common law and as a part of the 
Maryland Uniform Commercial Code due to the unique position that banks 
occupy in society.28  To determine whether banks have breached that duty, 
expert testimony is often required to establish the relevant standard of 
care,29 except in situations in which such information falls within the 
common knowledge of the average layperson.30  Despite Maryland’s 
recognition of a common knowledge exception, the boundaries of the 
exception have been unclear, leading one scholar to propose an alternative, 
more structured definition in the field of medical malpractice.31
A.  Maryland Banks Owe a Duty of Reasonable Care to Their 
Customers 
 
Maryland courts recognize that banks owe a duty of reasonable care to 
their customers.  This tort duty initially arose out of the common law.32  
The Commercial Code also imposes a standard of care on banks to comply 
with reasonable commercial standards in their geographic area, and this 
duty is justified by the position that banks occupy in relation to the public 
welfare.33
1.  The Common Law Imposes a Duty of Reasonable Care on 
Persons Who Hold Themselves Out as Having Knowledge or 
Proficiency in a Skilled Occupation 
 
At common law, individuals holding themselves out as possessing 
requisite knowledge or proficiency in a skilled occupation had to act with 
reasonable care toward their customers.34
 
 26. Id.  
  To establish a cause of action for 
negligence under the common law, a plaintiff must prove the following: a 
 27. Id. at 27, 990 A.2d at 1085. 
 28. See infra Part II.A. 
 29. See infra Part II.B. 
 30. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 31. See infra Part II.C. 
 32. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 33. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 34. Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 307 Md. 527, 541, 515 A.2d 756, 763 (1986) (citing 
St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 219–20, 278 A.2d 12, 26 (1971)).   
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legal duty owed to him by the defendant, a breach of that duty, a causal 
relationship between such breach and the harm suffered, and resulting 
damages.35  In the absence of a legal obligation owed by the defendant to 
the plaintiff, no action in negligence exists.36  Generally, tort duties are 
imposed as a matter of policy.37  While contractual relationships and 
statutory text can independently impose duties upon a party, such 
obligations do not necessarily give rise to a duty and therefore a negligence 
action in tort.38
Courts consider various factors when deciding whether to recognize a 
tort duty in a particular situation, including the foreseeability of the harm to 
the plaintiff,
   
39 the nature of the harm likely to result,40 the relationship 
between the parties,41 and the possibility of preventing future harm.42  
Where the nature of an expected loss is primarily economic, courts focus 
less on the foreseeability of the harm and more on the relationship existing 
between the parties, thereby requiring a more intimate nexus before 
imposing liability.43  Contractual privity, for example, is sufficient to 
satisfy this nexus.44  Courts will also consider the nature of the business of 
the party who owes the potential duty when determining whether a tort duty 
is appropriate.45  Where an individual holds himself out as possessing the 
requisite proficiency and knowledge in skilled occupations, the court may 
impose a duty to act with reasonable care,46 thus establishing the existence 
of a cause of action for professional negligence.47
 
 35. Cramer v. Hous. Opportunities Comm’n, 304 Md. 705, 712, 501 A.2d 35, 39 (1985). 
 
 36. Jacques, 307 Md. at 532, 515 A.2d at 758.   
 37. Id. at 533–34, 515 A.2d at 759.  Tort duties may also “arise from the public nature of the 
defendant’s calling, from one’s holding of a public office, from bailment, from prescription or 
custom, or from one’s control of a dangerous thing.”  3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, 
JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS § 18.1, at 757–58 (3d ed. 2007).  
 38. Jacques, 307 Md. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759. 
 39. Farmers Bank of Md. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 163 Md. App. 158, 170, 877 A.2d 1145, 
1152 (2005) (quoting Sun ‘n Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 582 P.2d 920, 936 (Cal. 1978)), aff’d 
sub nom. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Allfirst Bank, 394 Md. 270, 905 A.2d 366 (2006).   
 40. Jacques, 307 Md. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Farmers Bank of Md., 163 Md. App. at 170, 877 A.2d at 1152 (quoting Sun ’n Sand, Inc., 
582 P.2d at 936).   
 43. Jacques, 307 Md. at 534–35, 515 A.2d at 759–60. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 541, 515 A.2d at 763. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See generally Jill Wieber Lens, The (Overlooked) Consequence of Easing the Prohibition 
of Expert Legal Testimony in Professional Negligence Claims, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 53, 64–
65 (2009) (discussing the development of professional negligence law). 
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Courts first applied professional negligence concepts in the medical 
malpractice context.48  Pursuant to this doctrine, a professional defendant 
may be found liable if “he fails to ‘exercise the skill and knowledge 
normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing 
in similar communities.’”49  Courts have applied this standard, which may 
take into account the industry custom,50 to a variety of professional 
negligence contexts, including those involving engineers, lawyers, 
accountants, pilots, and plumbers.51
2.  Maryland Banks Must Observe Reasonable Commercial 
Standards in Exercising Ordinary Care Pursuant to Statute 
   
The Maryland Uniform Commercial Code imposes a duty of ordinary 
care on banks.52  Even in the absence of language in the Commercial Code 
explicitly imposing liability on banks for specific actions, Maryland courts 
have held the duty of ordinary care generally imposed by the Commercial 
Code to be applicable.53  For example, in Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co.,54
 
 48. Id. 
 
Equitable transferred $20,000 belonging to Taylor to a third party’s account 
after receiving an unendorsed treasurer’s check and a handwritten letter 
 49. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965)); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 12 (2010) (“If an actor 
has skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or knowledge are 
circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the actor has behaved as a 
reasonably careful person.”). 
 50. See Jacques, 307 Md. at 543–44, 515 A.2d at 764 (noting that to prove a bank’s 
negligence the plaintiff needed to show that the defendant bank had “failed to exercise that degree 
of care which a reasonably prudent bank would have exercised under the same or similar 
circumstances,” and that the plaintiff may offer proof of an industry standard to establish the 
applicable standard of care). 
 51. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bethea, 351 Md. 513, 529–30, 718 A.2d 1187, 1195 (1998) (noting 
that claims of negligence against lawyers should be judged against the traditional standard 
applicable to professional negligence actions); Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222, 227, 285 A.2d 
612, 615 (1972) (affirming the trial court’s jury instructions that the defendant had “a duty to 
perform, which duty is that which any careful and prudent engineer in the Cecil County area or the 
tri-state area here would perform under like circumstances”). 
 52. Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 155, 304 A.2d 838, 841 (1973).  Reasonable 
care is defined as “observance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in which 
the person is located, with respect to the business in which the person is engaged.” MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. LAW § 3-103(a)(7) (LexisNexis 2002).   
 53. See Taylor, 269 Md. at 155, 304 A.2d at 841–42 (noting that even though no specific 
textual provision of the Commercial Code addresses a bank’s liability for negligently paying an 
item, “‘[h]ints . . . abound’” within the Commercial Code as to that liability); see also COM. LAW 
§ 1-103 (explaining that where the Commercial Code is silent, principles of common law remain 
applicable); cf. COM. LAW § 4-103(a) (noting that a bank is prohibited from disclaiming liability 
for “its lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care”). 
 54. 269 Md. 149, 304 A.2d 838. 
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purportedly written on behalf of Mr. Taylor.55  At trial, Taylor contended 
that Equitable was liable for transferring the funds without proper 
authorization.56  The trial court concluded that Taylor’s own negligence in 
failing to assert his rights aggressively, rather than any negligence on the 
part of Equitable, had proximately caused the loss.57  The Maryland Court 
of Appeals disagreed, determining that an action in tort could lie because 
Equitable failed to comply with reasonable commercial standards by 
requiring written instructions from Taylor personally.58
The statutory imposition of this duty of reasonable care upon banks 
aligns with the application of tort duties at common law.  That is, because 
the nature of an expected loss in the banking context is primarily economic, 
a close examination of the relationship between the parties is necessary.
 
59  
Since banks and their customers enjoy at least an implied contractual 
relationship,60 the requirement for such a close relationship is met.61  
Additionally, banks operate through the use of public funds and “are 
invested with enormous public trust.”62  In fact, the State of Maryland 
requires an investigation evaluating the character, responsibility, and fitness 
of the directors and incorporators of a bank before the bank may receive its 
charter.63
 
 55. Id. at 153, 304 A.2d at 840.  The factual scenario in the case was peculiar and complex.  
Frank Terranova, a business associate of Taylor’s, allegedly wrote the letter at issue in order to 
reroute the money from the treasurer’s check into his own possession.  Id. at 151, 153 & n.3, 304 
A.2d at 840 & n.3 (noting that the account to which Terranova requested that Equitable transfer 
the money was actually an alter ego of Terranova).  Taylor had initially drawn the treasurer’s 
check to make an investment in a hotel, but a person claiming to be Taylor later called Equitable 
to request that Equitable divert the funds to the account of Terranova’s alter ego.  Id. at 151–53, 
304 A.2d at 840.  Upon receiving the letter from Terranova, Equitable credited the $20,000 to this 
account, and unbeknownst to Taylor, Terranova then used the money to obtain a lease on the hotel 
in his own name rather than in Taylor’s name.  See id. at 153–54, 304 A.2d at 841 (suggesting this 
course of events).  Taylor thereafter wired $40,000 through Equitable for this investment.  Id. at 
153, 304 A.2d at 841.  Only later did Taylor discover that the account to which he had wired the 
additional money had been opened by Terranova and was also subject to his control.  Id. at 153 
n.4, 304 A.2d at 841 n.4.  Hence, Terranova had usurped the entire $60,000 investment that Taylor 
thought he had made in the hotel property, using the money to invest in his own name and leaving 
Taylor with no interest in the property.  Id. at 154, 304 A.2d at 841. 
  This investigation ensures that the officers of the bank 
 56. Id. at 151, 304 A.2d at 839. 
 57. Id. at 154, 304 A.2d at 841. 
 58. Id. at 158, 304 A.2d at 843. 
 59. See, e.g., Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 307 Md. 527, 534–35, 515 A.2d 756, 759–
60 (1986) (requiring such an analysis when evaluating a bank’s potential liability for negligently 
processing a loan application).  
 60. Magness v. Equitable Trust Co., 176 Md. 528, 531, 6 A.2d 241, 243 (1939). 
 61. Jacques, 307 Md. at 534–35, 515 A.2d at 759–60.  
 62. Djowharzadeh v. City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 646 P.2d 616, 619 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 1982). 
 63. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 3-203(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2010); Jacques, 307 
Md. at 542, 515 A.2d at 764.   
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“command confidence and warrant belief that the business of the proposed 
commercial bank will be conducted honestly and efficiently” and “[w]ill 
promote public convenience and advantage.”64
To establish a breach of the standard of care in the banking context, a 
plaintiff must show, as in any other professional negligence case, that the 
defendant bank did not exercise the degree of care a reasonably prudent 
bank would have exercised under similar circumstances.
  
65  Where 
necessary, courts will admit evidence of the industry standard, often 
provided by an expert, to prove the applicable standard of care.66
B.  Expert Testimony Is Generally Required to Establish the Standard 
of Care in a Professional Negligence Case 
   
The requirement of expert testimony to establish a standard of care has 
evolved from an initial ban on non-firsthand testimony at common law67 to 
generalized admissibility of such testimony.68  While modern law generally 
permits expert testimony when it is helpful to the jury,69 a common 
knowledge exception exists in Maryland that limits expert testimony when 
the subject matter falls within a lay jury’s knowledge.70  For this reason, 
expert testimony is generally not required to establish a standard of care if it 
falls within the common knowledge of the average layperson.71
1.  The Use of Expert Testimony to Establish the Standard of Care 
Has Increased with Advances in Technology and Specialization  
 
Expert testimony that is useful or helpful to the trier of fact and sheds 
light on a field of specialized knowledge is generally admissible.72
 
 64. FIN. INST. § 3-203(b)(2), (b)(3)(i); see also Jacques, 307 Md. at 542–43, 515 A.2d at 764 
(noting that imposing a tort duty on the banking industry is consistent with the nature of the 
banking industry and that industry’s relation to public welfare). 
  While 
 65. Jacques, 307 Md. at 543–44, 515 A.2d at 764. 
 66. Id. at 544, 515 A.2d at 764. 
 67. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 68. See infra Part II.B.1–2.   
 69. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 70. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 71. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 72. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 702.  At both the state and federal levels, however, the proposed 
expert testimony must satisfy certain criteria in order to be admitted by the court.  In Maryland, to 
determine the admissibility of expert testimony, the trial judge must evaluate whether the 
testimony is a proper subject for expert testimony, whether the proposed expert is qualified to 
testify based on his education and experience, and whether the proposed testimony is competent.  
State v. Blackwell, 408 Md. 677, 695–96, 971 A.2d 296, 306–07 (2009).  At the federal level, an 
expert witness must have sufficient “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to assist 
the trier of fact.  FED. R. EVID. 702.  Courts have generally applied this standard liberally.  See, 
e.g., Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging this liberal application of 
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modern standards tend to favor admissibility of expert testimony,73 
historically expert testimony did not enjoy such widespread acceptance.  
Rather, under early English common law, the witness had to have firsthand 
knowledge to testify in court—he had to “speak as a knower, not merely a 
guesser.”74 Under this framework, experts and other witnesses were not 
permitted to testify regarding the facts of the case unless they had personal 
knowledge of the event.75
Over time, however, the English common law began to develop ways 
to receive expert knowledge.  For example, in early cases, some courts 
employed special juries, made up of a collection of persons “especially 
fitted to judge of the peculiar facts upon which the particular issue at bar 
turn[ed].”
  
76  While the extent to which the special jury’s conclusions were 
binding is unclear, the court could certainly consider the special jury’s 
statements in making its decision.77  In cases involving trade regulations, 
the special jury’s determination would often drive the judge or mayor’s 
decision.  For instance, Judge Learned Hand provided an example in which 
an individual presented a grievance to the mayor that a tradesman had sold 
him putrid meat.78  In that situation, the mayor would then “summon 
persons of the trade of the man accused, as being well acquainted with the 
facts,” and the verdict of these individuals would decide the outcome of the 
case.79  Concurrently, courts also began to summon skilled persons to 
advise the court regarding certain issues of fact.80
 
Rule 702).  In the era following Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993), however, there has been an increasing emphasis on the “gatekeeping” role of the courts in 
excluding unreliable expert testimony.  Cf. 509 U.S. at 592–94, 597 (proposing a framework for 
courts to use in assessing the reliability of proffered scientific expert testimony); Kumho Tire Co. 
v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–49 (1999) (holding that Daubert’s relevancy and reliability 
requirements apply not only to scientific but also to nonscientific expert testimony); Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (stating that neither Daubert nor the Federal Rules of 
Evidence requires courts to admit opinion evidence that lacks a sufficient connection to existing 
data).  
  For example, in Buller v. 
 73. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 74. Lens, supra note 47, at 55 (quoting 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 1917, at 1–2 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1978)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see Adams v. Canon, (1622) 73 Eng. Rep. 117 (K.B.) 117 n.15 (Coke, J.) (noting that “it 
is not satisfactory for the witness to say, that he thinks or persuadeth himself”).  
 75. See Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 415 (1952) (analyzing the 
common-law restriction on witnesses who did not have firsthand knowledge of the event about 
which they sought to testify and concluding that early courts most likely sought to impose a 
personal knowledge requirement upon witnesses).   
 76. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 
HARV. L. REV.  40, 40 (1901).  
 77. Id. at 41. 
 78. Id. at 41. 
 79. Id. at 41–42. 
 80. Id. at 42. 
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Crips,81 the judge asked London merchants to advise him regarding the 
impact of a refusal to negotiate promissory notes.82  Nonetheless, these 
early uses of expert witnesses merely allowed those witnesses to testify to 
the judge rather than to the jury.83  After receiving the expert’s advice, the 
judge would then instruct the jury regarding the expert’s statements.84
As science and technology progressed, however, courts increasingly 
heard cases involving issues of which the jurors had only minimal 
knowledge.
   
85  Consequently, a rise in the use of expert testimony 
accompanied the growth of specialist occupations and professions and a 
developing belief that only experts could properly advise jurors regarding 
certain matters.86  While initially experts testified only about facts or 
general information,87 beginning in the 1730s, highly skilled individuals, 
such as surgeons, apothecaries, and physicians, typically proffered 
testimony regarding the mental or physical health of the individual in 
question.88  Thus, an exception developed whereby expert witnesses could 
testify to the jury concerning “a class of facts about which expert persons 
alone could have knowledge” in order to “shed additional light” on the 
issue for the trier of fact89 and the possible inferences to be drawn from 
those facts.90
 
 81. (1703) 87 Eng. Rep. 793 (K.B.). 
 
 82. Id. at 794.  
 83. Lens, supra note 47, at 56.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Cf. Ladd, supra note 75, at 417 (“The use of expert opinion has expanded with the 
continuous and rapid progress of science which has opened up new areas of scientific proof.”). 
 86. Déirdre M. Dwyer, Expert Evidence in the English Civil Courts, 1550–1800, 28 J. LEG. 
HIST. 93, 114 (2007).  For two early cases demonstrating judicial recognition that only skilled 
witnesses could properly advise jurors regarding certain issues, see Folkes v. Chadd, (1782) 99 
Eng. Rep. 589 (K.B.) 590 (“[I]n matters of science, the reasonings of men of science can only be 
answered by men of science.”), and Coate’s Case, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 542 (K.B.) 542 (noting 
that “the only proper guide” to determine whether an individual should be admitted to a madhouse 
was the opinion of a physician). 
 87. See, e.g., Pickering v. Barkley, (1648) 82 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B.) 587–88 (testimony of 
experts admitted to determine whether pirates were considered perils of the sea); see also Dwyer, 
supra note 86, at 101 (noting additionally that “[t]he types of question that formed the substance 
of expert evidence expanded and developed in complexity over time”).   
 88. Dwyer, supra note 86, at 101.  This practice constituted “an advance in the types of 
inference involved, because experts were now being asked to apply their knowledge to an 
individual rather than simply to describe the general state of affairs.”  Id. 
 89. Lens, supra note 47, at 56 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 74, § 1917, at 3–4) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 90. Charles T. McCormick, Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rule and Expert 
Testimony, 23 TEX. L. REV. 109, 126 (1945).   
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2.  Modern Expert Testimony Rules Generally Permit Expert 
Testimony Where It Assists the Trier of Fact 
Modern evidence law favors the admission of expert testimony,91
 Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue.  In making that determination, the court shall determine 
(1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of 
the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a 
sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony.
 and 
state and federal evidence rules have generally codified this principle.  
Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-702, which governs the admissibility of 
expert testimony, states as follows: 
92
The limited restrictions placed on expert testimony by the evidentiary rules 
generally create a preference for admissibility of expert testimony.  In fact, 
“the only apparent restriction” within the evidence rules themselves seems 
to be that the testimony must aid the trier of fact.
 
93  Scientific advances 
have resulted in the admission of expert testimony in a variety of 
contexts.94  For example, in Maryland, courts have permitted experts to 
testify regarding post-traumatic stress disorder following rape to 
demonstrate lack of consent,95 the rental value of a particular piece of 
property based on the prior volume of business activity,96
 
 91. See, e.g., State ex rel. Jones v. Recht, 655 S.E.2d 126, 136 (W. Va. 2007) (explaining that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which sets forth the standard for admitting expert testimony, 
“‘adopts a liberal stance on admitting expert testimony and favors admissibility’”); see also supra 
note 
 the standard of 
93 and accompanying text.  
 92. MD. R. 5-702.  Although the language is not identical, this Rule largely mirrors the 
federal standard, which reads as follows: 
  If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) 
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.   
FED. R. EVID. 702.   
 93. Lens, supra note 47, at 56 (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 702).  As noted in supra 
note 72, however, courts must nonetheless carefully evaluate the reliability of expert testimony 
prior to its admission.  
 94. Ladd, supra note 75, at 417; see also 1 GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 13, at 67 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (“In [one study of] California Superior 
Court trials in the late 1980s, experts appeared in 86% of the trials; and on average, there were 3.3 
experts per trial.  Some commentators claim that the American judicial hearing is becoming trial 
by expert.” (footnote omitted)).   
 95. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 91, 517 A.2d 741, 741–42 (1986). 
 96. State Roads Comm’n v. Novosel, 203 Md. 619, 624–25, 102 A.2d 563, 565 (1954). 
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care necessary for operation of a multi-million dollar financial institution,97 
and the standard of care owed by banks when evaluating loan 
applications.98
Although expert testimony is generally admissible so long as it aids 
the trier of fact,
   
99 it does not follow that simply because expert testimony is 
admissible, it is also required.100  Indeed, the common law continues to 
view experts with some suspicion for multiple reasons.101  For instance, 
experts are permitted to testify about opinions in addition to facts,102 and 
experts are the only witnesses permitted to accept more than nominal 
monetary payment for services.103  Nevertheless, courts have recognized an 
apparent exception to this rule: Where a topic requiring special or 
uncommon knowledge forms a main issue in the case, experts must testify 
regarding that issue.104  In most other cases, reflecting this continuing 
suspicion, evidence law limits expert testimony to cases in which the issue 
at bar is beyond the ken of the layperson.105
3.  Maryland Courts Have Employed the Common Knowledge 
Exception, Only Requiring Expert Testimony in Cases in Which 
 
 
 97. Billman v. State of Md. Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 88 Md. App. 79, 113, 593 A.2d 684, 
700–01 (1991). 
 98. See Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 307 Md. 527, 545, 515 A.2d 756, 764 (1986) 
(noting that the lower court had permitted use of an expert for this reason). 
 99. MD. R. 5-702; see also supra note 72 (discussing some judicially imposed limitations on 
expert testimony).  
 100. Maldonado v. Am. Airlines, 405 Md. 467, 480, 952 A.2d 294, 302 (2008) (“Obviously, 
the fact that expert testimony may be admissible, however, is not dispositive of the issue regarding 
whether it is required.”).  
 101. See Wrobleski v. de Lara, 353 Md. 509, 523, 727 A.2d 930, 936 (1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“‘[E]xpert testimony is viewed with some suspicion and . . . [t]he 
natural bias which the expert may have in favor of the party who employed and is paying him is 
the chief cause for the discredit that has been cast upon expert testimony as a whole.’” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting State v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 281 P.2d 707, 713 (Or. 1955))). 
 102. Stephen D. Easton, Can We Talk?: Removing Counterproductive Ethical Restraints Upon 
Ex Parte Communication Between Attorneys and Adverse Expert Witnesses, 76 IND. L.J. 647, 
658–61 (2001) (noting that unlike lay witnesses, the expert witness may testify about her opinions 
and inferences not limited to her own observations). 
 103. Cf., e.g., id. at 655 (noting that “[e]xperienced trial attorneys tend to place witnesses into 
two categories,” which are “the witnesses an attorney is stuck with and those she buys on the open 
market”).   
 104. See, e.g., Suburban Hosp. Ass’n v. Hadary, 22 Md. App. 186, 189–90, 322 A.2d 258, 
260–61 (1974) (noting that expert witnesses are generally required in suits against a hospital for 
death or injury to a patient where the acts leading to the death or injury are beyond the common 
knowledge of a juror); see also, e.g., Chi. Coll. of Osteopathic Med. v. George A. Fuller Co., 719 
F.2d 1335, 1346 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that expert testimony regarding an architect’s standard of 
care was required because that information was not within the common experience of the jurors). 
 105. See, e.g., Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 392, 423, 987 A.2d 98, 116 (2010) (noting that 
proffered expert testimony may be inadmissible where the topic of that testimony is within the 
understanding of the average layperson). 
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the Relevant Issue Does Not Fall Within a Jury’s Common 
Knowledge  
By demanding that expert testimony aid the trier of fact in 
understanding a particular fact or concept at issue in the case,106 Maryland 
courts impliedly exclude expert testimony in cases in which the issues are 
within the jury’s common knowledge.107  For instance, in Central Cab Co. 
v. Clarke,108 expert testimony was not necessary to establish legal 
malpractice when an attorney failed to notify his client of termination of his 
employment, resulting in a default judgment against the client.109  
Analogizing such an action to that of a dentist pulling the wrong tooth, the 
court concluded that the use of expert testimony to establish the applicable 
standard of care was unnecessary.110  Similarly, in Lowitt v. Pearsall 
Chemical Corp. of Maryland,111 the Court of Appeals held that expert 
testimony was not required to prove that an insurance agent complied with 
the standard of care when he failed to secure an insurance policy for his 
client.112  Rather, since the insurance broker secured a policy that was 
freely acknowledged to be a “subterfuge,” expert testimony was not 
necessary to establish the standard of care.113
In the banking context, Maryland courts have declined to hold that 
expert testimony is required as a matter of law to establish negligence.  For 
example, in Free State Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellis,
  
114
 
 106. MD. R. 5-702; see also Shemondy v. State, 147 Md. App. 602, 612, 810 A.2d 36, 42 
(2002) (noting that Maryland Rule 5-702 allows the admission of expert testimony if it assists the 
trier of fact in determining a fact at issue). 
 the Court of Special 
Appeals determined that the common knowledge exception applied to a 
 107. See e.g., Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 692, 629 A.2d 685, 706 (1993) (“‘Expert 
testimony . . . will be inappropriate when the expert can add nothing to what the judge and jurors 
already know or could infer from the evidence.’”).  Thus, the common knowledge exception posits 
that expert testimony is unnecessary to prove an issue within the general knowledge of the jury.  
See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs. Ltd., 109 Md. App. 217, 257, 674 
A.2d 106, 125 (1996) (noting that expert testimony is only required where the inference is “‘so 
particularly related to some science or profession that it is beyond the ken of the average layman’” 
(quoting Virgil v. “Kash N’ Karry” Serv. Corp., 61 Md. App. 23, 31, 484 A.2d 652, 656 (1984))), 
aff’d, 346 Md. 122, 695 A.2d 153 (1997); see also Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222, 224, 285 
A.2d 612, 614 (1972) (acknowledging the existence of situations in which “negligence is so 
gross” or what was “done so obviously improper or unskillful” that expert testimony regarding the 
applicable standard of care is not necessary); Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp., 134 Md. App. 512, 
517, 760 A.2d 315, 318 (2000) (noting that expert testimony is not required on matters that jurors 
would be aware of “by virtue of common knowledge”).  
 108. 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (1970). 
 109. Id. at 551, 270 A.2d at 667.   
 110. Id. 
 111. 242 Md. 245, 219 A.2d 67 (1966).  
 112. Id. at 254–56, 219 A.2d at 73. 
 113. Id. at 254–55, 219 A.2d at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 114. 45 Md. App. 159, 411 A.2d 1090 (1980).  
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situation in which the bank released a customer’s collateral, in the form of a 
promissory note secured by a deed of trust, to a third party in exchange for 
a paper writing that was not collateral.115  The case was “of the type that 
the average juror would know without expert testimony that banks simply 
do not ordinarily do what the . . . [b]ank did in this case.”116  Similarly, in 
Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Harrison,117 the Court of Special Appeals 
determined that expert testimony was not necessary to establish the 
applicable standard of care that a reasonable bank would have exercised 
when the defendant bank accepted a check that was not endorsed with a 
payee’s full name, thus violating the bank’s internal training guidelines.118  
According to the court, such a determination was not “beyond the ken of 
the average lay[person].”119
In contrast to the cases above, where a complex procedure or medical 
judgment is at issue, Maryland courts have determined that expert 
testimony is necessary and that the common knowledge exception does not 
apply.  For example, in Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
  
120
 
 115. Id. at 163, 411 A.2d at 1092.  The facts of Ellis were as follows: Ellis had obtained a loan 
from the bank by assigning a promissory note for $200,000, payable to Ellis by a third party, 
Wolman.  Id. at 160, 411 A.2d at 1091.  The note was secured by a deed of trust on Wolman’s 
home.  Id.  The bank later released the promissory note as collateral at Wolman’s request and 
substituted instead a “wraparound deed of trust” for $160,000, payable to Wolman from the 
purchaser of his home, Palmer.  Id. at 161, 411 A.2d at 1091.  Ellis later discovered that the bank 
had released his secured interest in the Wolman residence, receiving instead “‘a piece of paper, 
one hundred sixty thousand dollars, from Dr. Palmer to Mr. Wolman.’”  Id. at 161–62, 411 A.2d 
at 1091–92.   
 the Court of 
Special Appeals considered the necessity of expert testimony in 
determining whether an automobile manufacturer had designed a car’s 
 116. Id. at 164, 411 A.2d at 1093.   
 117. 186 Md. App. 228, 973 A.2d 841 (2009).  The facts of Harrison were as follows: 
Following a fire on a property insured by Harrison and another party, Harrison submitted a claim 
to her insurer, who issued a check for $140,000 made payable to Harrison, the other insured 
individual, and Saxon Mortgage Services, the mortgagee on the property.  Id. at 236, 973 A.2d at 
845.  The insurance company hand-delivered the check to Harrison.  Id., 973 A.2d at 846.  Later, 
the law firm of Dunlap Grubb Weaver and Whitbeck (“the Dunlap firm”) endorsed the check and 
presented it for deposit, and although Saxon Mortgage Services neither endorsed the check nor 
authorized anyone to endorse it on its behalf, “Saxon” was handwritten on the back of the check.  
Id. at 236–37, 973 A.2d at 846.  The depository bank accepted the check without contacting Saxon 
to confirm the validity of the endorsement and thereafter transferred $140,000 to the Dunlap 
firm’s bank account.  Id. at 237, 973 A.2d at 846.  Once Saxon learned that the check was 
deposited without its endorsement, it requested that the insurer provide it with a replacement 
payment for the check, but the insurer declined to do so.  Id.   
 118. Id. at 290–91, 973 A.2d at 877–78.  The court also relied on the bank’s violation of the 
express instruction on the check that required any payee to endorse the back of the check such that 
the endorsement matched the payee’s name on the front of the check.  Id.   
 119. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp., 134 Md. App. 512, 518, 
760 A.2d 315, 318 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120. 134 Md. App. 512, 760 A.2d 315. 
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airbag defectively.121  The court concluded that the standard for evaluating 
effective airbag design was “well beyond the ken of the average 
layman,”122 since the “correct resolution of that issue requires the 
application of science, mechanics, and engineering, rather than of matters 
that jurors ‘would be aware [of] by virtue of common knowledge.’”123  
Similarly, in Rodriguez v. Clarke,124 the Court of Appeals found that the 
plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish negligence because the 
gravamen of a medical malpractice action rests on the physician’s failure to 
use necessary skills or procedures.125
C.  The Common Knowledge Exception’s Unclear Boundaries Led One 
Scholar to Propose a More Thoughtful Test for Invoking That 
Exception in the Area of Medical Malpractice 
  Such cases demonstrate that 
Maryland courts have limited the use of expert testimony to issues outside 
the common knowledge of the average layperson. 
Although seemingly intuitive, the common knowledge exception has 
proven difficult to apply with consistency and clarity.126  Indeed, courts in 
many jurisdictions have not established clear boundaries for the common 
knowledge rule.  For example, in Patterson v. Arif,127 the Court of Appeals 
of Tennessee held that the common knowledge exception applies when the 
alleged “negligence is as blatant as a ‘fly floating in a bowl of buttermilk’ 
so that all mankind knows that such things are not done absent 
negligence.”128
Despite the eloquence of this phrase, oft-provided examples of the 
common knowledge exception leave a great deal to inference and show 
these trite phrases to be “meaningless.”
   
129  For example, in Hubbard ex rel. 
Hubbard v. Reed,130
 
 121. Id. at 518, 760 A.2d at 319. 
 the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that a 
 122. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123. Id. (alteration in original). 
 124. 400 Md. 39, 926 A.2d 736 (2007). 
 125. Id. at 71, 926 A.2d at 755.  Failure to produce expert testimony to demonstrate negligence 
in such a scenario may justify a court’s decision to grant a party’s motion for summary judgment 
where proof of negligence is otherwise lacking.  Id. at 71–72, 926 A.2d at 755. 
 126. See Joseph H. King, The Common Knowledge Exception to the Expert Testimony 
Requirement for Establishing the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 51, 
52 (2007) (“The facile simplicity of the easy ‘common knowledge’ expression, however, belies 
the challenging nature of the concept.”).   
 127. 173 S.W.3d 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 
 128. Id. at 12 (quoting Murphy v. Schwartz, 739 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)).  
 129. See King, supra note 126, at 54 (“That such deceptively reassuring, but basically 
meaningless ‘tests’ have proven popular is perhaps tacit acknowledgement of the absence of 
meaningful guidance from the courts.” (footnote omitted)). 
 130. 774 A.2d 495 (N.J. 2001). 
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dentist who pulled the wrong tooth was “negligent as a matter of common 
knowledge,”131 while a Massachusetts appellate court determined in 
Anderson v. Attar132 that a dentist’s alleged use of such a hard cement that 
required excessive force to detach from the patient’s mouth was not a 
matter within the jury’s common knowledge.133  While plainly the action in 
the former case appears negligent, and the action in the latter case likely 
requires elucidation by someone familiar with dental techniques, no 
mention is made of the myriad possibilities that fall between these two ends 
of the spectrum, where “very real competing concerns” lie.134
Recognizing the innumerable situations that will fall between these 
two extremes,
 
135 Professor Joseph H. King has proposed a test for applying 
the common knowledge exception in medical malpractice cases.136
a. The specific conduct that allegedly constituted negligence was 
of such a nature that not only could an unlicensed layperson 
legally perform it without violating or offending applicable 
medical or health care licensure statutes or duly authorized 
regulations governing the practice of the health care professions, 
but also that such an unlicensed layperson would ordinarily be 
deemed competent and foreseeably expected to routinely perform 
such conduct; or, 
  
Specifically, he has posited that, for the common knowledge exception to 
apply, one of the following two preconditions must be met: 
b. The specific decision making by the health care provider that 
allegedly constituted negligent conduct that caused the injury in 
question did not involve the exercise of uniquely professional 
medical skills, a deliberate balancing of medical risks and 
benefits, or the exercise of therapeutic judgment.137
Under Professor King’s formulation, a finding of either precondition would 
permit a court to apply the common knowledge exception.
 
138
The first precondition of Professor King’s test would eliminate the 
need for expert testimony where a layperson may perform the activity at 
  
 
 131. Id. at 500–01. 
 132. 841 N.E.2d 1286 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). 
 133. Id. at 1287, 1289.  
 134. See King, supra note 126, at 52–54 (noting that while some cases discussing the common 
knowledge exception fall at either of these two extremes, it is often difficult to apply this 
exception in practice).  
 135. Cf. id. 
 136. Id. at 91.   
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  But see id. (“The fact that a plaintiff satisfies one of the preceding preconditions 
would not guarantee ipso facto that the court would apply the common knowledge exception.  
Rather, it would merely make it permissible for the court to do so . . . .”). 
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issue without a license, and where that layperson would ordinarily be 
competent and “foreseeably . . . expected” to perform that activity.139  
Thus, under the first precondition, the common knowledge exception would 
not apply if relevant regulations and statutes forbid the conduct at issue.140
Even if a layperson may perform the activity without a license, the 
first precondition would not apply where a layperson would not possess the 
qualifications to routinely perform the activity or would not “foreseeably be 
expected to routinely do so.”
   
141  For example, in Lawrence v. Frost Street 
Outpatient Surgical Center, L.P.,142 the court found expert testimony 
unnecessary to evaluate the applicable standard of care that a medical 
professional should use in transferring a patient with a numb leg from a 
wheelchair to a vehicle.143  The court determined that failure of the 
employee to properly assist the patient’s transfer from the wheelchair to the 
car fell within the scope of the common knowledge exception,144 stating 
that “[t]his is something ordinary individuals, untrained in the medical 
profession, do on a regular basis when picking up family and friends after 
surgery.”145  Accordingly, Professor King’s first precondition would permit 
use of the common knowledge exception.146
Professor King’s second precondition would permit use of the 
common knowledge exception even when a person must have a license to 
perform the conduct at issue.
  
147  Under this precondition, courts focus on 
the defendant’s alleged negligent decision making.148
 
 139. Id. at 92. 
  If the decision does 
not involve “the exercise of professional skills, a balancing of costs and 
benefits, or the exercise of therapeutic judgment,” courts may apply the 
 140. Id. at 91.  However, if the second precondition, discussed in more detail below, were 
satisfied, the exception could still apply.  See id. (noting that only one precondition need be 
satisfied for the common knowledge exception to apply). 
 141. Id.  
 142. No. D042108, 2004 WL 2075401 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2004). 
 143. Id. at *5. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  By contrast, King discusses Cunningham v. Riverside Health System, Inc., 99 P.3d 
133 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), as an example of a case in which the first precondition of his proposed 
test would not permit use of the common knowledge exception.  King, supra note 126, at 93.  In 
Cunningham, a nursing assistant twisted the patient’s leg during postsurgical care for knee 
replacement surgery, causing her femur to break.  Cunningham, 99 P.3d at 135.  King opines that, 
under the first precondition, the common knowledge exception could not apply because “[w]hile 
helping a frail person to move in bed may be something lay persons routinely do, that is not so 
when the person attended is in the kind of precarious post-surgical orthopedic status we find in 
Cunningham.”  King, supra note 126, at 94. 
 146. See King, supra note 126, at 94–95 (explaining that “helping an outpatient move from a 
wheelchair to the car following outpatient surgery was what family and friends regularly do”). 
 147. Id. at 95. 
 148. Id.  
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common knowledge exception.149  For example, in Callahan v. Cho,150 a 
physician left a needle fragment inside a patient’s body following prosthetic 
hip surgery.151  The suturing needle broke during the procedure, and after a 
futile search for the needle fragment, the doctor concluded that “it was 
better to leave the needle fragment in the tissue” than conduct additional, 
more invasive searching for it.152  The court determined, in a manner 
consistent with the second precondition, that the doctor made a professional 
medical decision that included weighing the attendant risks and benefits to 
the patient, a decision that would not fall within the common knowledge of 
jurors.153  Thus, Professor King’s second precondition would not permit 
application of the common knowledge exception in this case.154
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
 
In Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A.,155 the Maryland Court of Appeals 
held that a plaintiff alleging negligence must provide expert testimony to 
establish a bank’s standard of care when adding a customer to an 
account.156  Writing for the majority, Judge Greene stated that because the 
average layperson has not acted as a bank officer when adding a name to a 
customer’s account, the complexity of the internal bank procedure at issue 
was beyond a layperson’s common knowledge.157  According to Judge 
Greene, although negligence is, at times, so obvious that it is easily 
recognizable by the average person,158 the Bank’s actions here were not 
sufficiently egregious and familiar to the public so as to eliminate the need 
for expert testimony regarding the standard of care.159
 
 149. Id. 
  Additionally, in 
light of changing bank procedures in the age of the Internet, as well as the 
 150. 437 F. Supp. 2d 557 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 151. Id. at 559–60.  
 152. Id. at 560.  Other than the broken needle, no additional complications occurred during the 
patient’s surgery.  Id. 
 153. Id. at 563; see King, supra note 126, at 97–99 (using Callahan as an illustration of a case 
that fell within the second precondition).    
 154. King, supra note 126, at 98–99. 
 155. 413 Md. 15, 990 A.2d 1078 (2010). 
 156. Id. at 27, 990 A.2d at 1085.  The court reached the same conclusion regarding Stephen’s 
breach of contract claim.  Id. at 40, 990 A.2d at 1093.  
 157. See id. at 18, 34–35, 990 A.2d at 1080, 1090 (“To explain this process, a plaintiff must 
produce expert testimony from someone familiar with the process from a bank’s perspective.”).  
The Schultz court also expressed doubt that most laypeople would have experience in adding a 
name to a bank account, even from the perspective of a bank customer.  Id. at 34, 990 A.2d at 
1090. 
 158. Id. at 29, 990 A.2d at 1086. 
 159. Id. at 36, 990 A.2d at 1091 (“The alleged negligence in this case, however, involved 
internal banking procedures that the trier of fact could not be expected to appreciate.”). 
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inability to convey hidden, internal bank procedures adequately through the 
customer experience, the court determined that expert testimony was 
necessary to establish the duty owed by the Bank to its customers when 
adding a name to an account.160  Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment 
of the Court of Special Appeals.161
In so holding, the court distinguished the procedures inherent in 
adding a customer’s name to an account from the clear negligence found in 
Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Harrison
 
162 and Free State Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Ellis.163  Although recognizing that a bank may act in an obviously 
negligent manner that the plaintiff may not need to present expert testimony 
to demonstrate that the bank breached its duty, the court explained that 
Harrison and Ellis did not foreclose the use of expert testimony, 
particularly when proving the standard of care owed by a bank.164  In the 
instant case, Stephen had provided a handwriting expert to discuss the 
alleged forgery of Schultz’s signature, but the court concluded that Stephen 
had failed to provide evidence of the industry standard of care after 
implying that the Bank should have exercised “greater care to discover the 
forgery.”165
Writing for the dissent, Judge Adkins asserted that the alleged 
negligence at issue was “well within” the understanding of a layperson.
   
166  
While the majority had found that adding a customer’s name to an account 
involved “numerous unknown procedures,”167
 
 160. Id. at 35, 990 A.2d at 1090.  
 the dissenting judges 
insisted that failure to enact and comply with security mechanisms and 
 161. Id. at 26, 40–41, 990 A.2d at 1085, 1093–94. 
 162. For additional information on Harrison, see supra notes 117–119 and accompanying text. 
 163. Schultz, 413 Md. at 30–31, 990 A.2d at 1087–88.  For additional information on Ellis, see 
supra notes 114–116 and accompanying text.  
 164. Schultz, 413 Md. at 30–32, 990 A.2d at 1087–89.  According to the court, these prior 
cases had “demonstrate[d] the practice of using expert testimony to establish [that] standard.”  Id. 
at 32, 990 A.2d at 1089. 
 165. Id. at 33–34, 990 A.2d at 1089.  In addition, the majority similarly rejected Stephen’s 
breach of contract claim as insufficient because he had failed to establish the extent of the Bank’s 
duty of care through expert testimony.  Id. at 37, 990 A.2d at 1091–92.  While Schultz was 
undeniably a customer of the Bank, and therefore owed a duty of ordinary care regardless of the 
contract’s specific terms, the court stated that the mere existence of that duty was insufficient to 
put the claim before the jury.  Id. at 39–40, 990 A.2d at 1092–93; see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. 
LAW § 4-103(a) (LexisNexis 2002) (stating that neither party to a banking contract can “disclaim a 
bank’s responsibility for its lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care”).  Rather, 
Stephen needed to prove the reasonable commercial standards prevailing in the banking industry 
in that geographic area, and by neglecting to provide expert testimony, he failed to do so.  Schultz, 
413 Md. at 40, 990 A.2d at 1093.   
 166. Id. at 41, 990 A.2d at 1094 (Adkins, J., dissenting).  Chief Judge Bell and Judge Murphy 
joined Judge Adkins in dissent.  Id. 
 167. Id. at 34–35, 990 A.2d at 1090 (majority opinion).  
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precautions is often visible and obvious.168  The dissent distinguished the 
procedure at issue from complex transactions such as international wire 
transfers, instead emphasizing that “[w]hatever Bank of America’s 
professional standard of care might have been, it logically could not have 
been less than a reasonable person’s duty to take ordinary care in day-to-
day life.”169  The dissenting judges expressed concern that imposing a 
requirement of expert testimony for a commonplace transaction would act 
as a financial barrier to a litigant—a barrier that the court should not impose 
lightly.170  Thus, Judge Adkins and her dissenting colleagues would have 
reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.171
IV.  ANALYSIS 
  
In Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A., the Maryland Court of Appeals 
held that the addition of a customer’s name to a bank account involves 
internal bank procedures of which a juror has only minimal 
understanding,172 thus obligating the plaintiff to present expert testimony to 
establish the bank’s standard of care.173  In so holding, the court erred 
because the procedures at issue were neither complex174 nor opaque.175  
Thus, expert testimony on this issue was unnecessary.176
Additionally, by failing to articulate a reasoned test for the application 
of the common knowledge exception, the court’s holding will likely lead to 
litigation inefficiency.
   
177  Specifically, the majority’s vague standard 
improperly places the burden of loss on the plaintiff by requiring the 
plaintiff either to hire an expert witness or to bear the risk that the court will 
dismiss his suit for failure to establish the applicable standard of care.178
 
 168. Id. at 42, 990 A.2d at 1094 (Adkins, J., dissenting).  For example, according to the 
dissent, if a bank allows someone to withdraw cash from an account based on an oral attestation 
that the account belongs to her, the lack of internal security procedures is evident.  Id. 
  
 169. Id. at 43–44, 990 A.2d at 1095–96 (noting further that “[t]he jury could have concluded 
that a reasonable bank would carefully examine identification before adding a signatory to an 
account, in order to protect the assets of its borrowers”).   
 170. Id. at 42, 990 A.2d at 1095.  Further, the dissent noted that, “‘[e]xcept for malpractice 
cases . . . there is no general rule or policy requiring expert testimony as to the standard of care, 
and this is true even in the increasingly broad area wherein expert opinion will be received.’”  Id. 
at 43, 990 A.2d at 1095 (alteration in original) (quoting HARPER ET AL., supra note 37, § 17.1, at 
605).    
 171. Id. at 45, 990 A.2d at 1096. 
 172. Id. at 27, 990 A.2d at 1085–86 (majority opinion). 
 173. Id., 990 A.2d at 1085.  
 174. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 175. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 176. See infra Part IV.A. 
 177. See infra Part IV.B. 
 178. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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To incentivize banks to develop innovative technology and establish a 
market for bank safety, the court should have instead placed the burden on 
the defendant bank.179  The court could have achieved this result by 
adopting a clearer, more reasoned test for Maryland courts to use when 
applying the common knowledge exception.180
A.  The Maryland Court of Appeals Erred in Requiring Expert 
Testimony to Establish the Bank’s Standard of Care  
 
The Schultz court improperly concluded that expert testimony is 
necessary to determine the Bank’s standard of care because the alleged 
negligence at issue fell with the jury’s common knowledge.  Current 
Maryland law does not require expert testimony to establish the standard of 
care when the alleged negligence falls within the common knowledge of the 
average layperson.181  Applying this principle, the Schultz court should not 
have required expert testimony because the negligence at issue involved 
neither complex182 nor opaque bank procedures.183
1.  Expert Testimony Was Not Necessary in the Instant Case 
Because Adding a Customer’s Name to a Bank Account Does 
Not Involve Complex Procedures 
  
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the addition of a 
customer’s name to an account involved complex bank procedures.  
Maryland courts have previously addressed a range of scenarios in 
determining whether expert testimony is required to establish the standard 
of care owed by a defendant.184  While the quintessential examples 
describing the range of the common knowledge exception notably sit at 
opposite ends of the spectrum, leaving a large gray area in the middle,185
 
 179. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 
the bank procedures at issue here are distinguishable from cases in which 
courts have required expert testimony.  
 180. See infra Part IV.C. 
 181. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 182. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 183. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 184. Compare Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp., 134 Md. App. 512, 518, 760 A.2d 315, 319 
(2000) (requiring expert testimony in a negligent airbag design case), with Saxon Mortg. Servs., 
Inc. v. Harrison, 186 Md. App. 228, 289–290, 973 A.2d 841, 877 (2009) (holding that expert 
testimony was not required to establish a violation of the standard of care when a bank cashed an 
improperly endorsed check). 
 185. See King, supra note 126, at 52–53 (noting that while courts can easily apply the common 
knowledge exception to some “straightforward” cases at either end of the spectrum, a vast range 
of cases fall somewhere along the spectrum, making the applicability of the common knowledge 
exception more difficult to determine).  
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Maryland courts have, for example, required expert testimony to 
determine the applicable standard of care in defective design cases186 and 
to demonstrate medical malpractice.187  Unlike those cases, however, 
adding a customer’s name to a bank account neither requires the highly 
specialized knowledge necessary to make informed decisions188 nor the 
critical levels of training189 or professional discretion.190
 
 186. See Wood, 134 Md. App. at 518, 760 A.2d at 319 (requiring a plaintiff to present expert 
testimony in a products liability case regarding a defectively designed airbag). 
  For that reason, 
the process of adding a customer’s name to an account can be easily 
distinguished from other areas in which Maryland courts have required 
expert testimony.  While the average person does not have experience 
 187. See Rodriguez v. Clarke, 400 Md. 39, 71, 926 A.2d 736, 755 (2007) (generally requiring 
expert testimony to prove negligence in medical malpractice cases).  
 188. Compare Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A., 413 Md. 15, 44, 990 A.2d 1078, 1096 (2010) 
(Adkins, J., dissenting) (noting that the jury was reviewing “a commonplace transaction involving 
common sense procedures,” and therefore reliance on common knowledge should have been 
appropriate), with Wood, 134 Md. App. at 518, 760 A.2d at 319 (noting that “[t]he correct 
resolution of [the] issue [of defectively designed airbags] requires the application of science, 
mechanics, and engineering, rather than of matters that jurors ‘would be aware [of] by virtue of 
common knowledge’” (fourth alteration in original)).  No particularized knowledge of financial 
institutions and procedures, science, or engineering is necessary to inquire about whether a person 
is properly authorized to add a customer’s name to an account.  Cf. Schultz, 413 Md. at 44, 990 
A.2d at 1096 (noting that “the jury was not being called upon to evaluate security protocols for an 
international wire transfer or mechanisms for operating ‘sweep’ accounts”).  Rather, such actions 
seem to fall within the ambit of generalized account security—the absence of which is often 
obvious and within the common knowledge of a layperson.  See Schultz, 413 Md. at 42–43, 990 
A.2d at 1094–95 (noting, as a clear example of a missing security measure, that “if a bank allowed 
an unknown person to walk in and withdraw cash based only on her oral attestation that she was 
the named account holder, that would be a case of obvious negligence”).     
 189. Compare Banking: Career Guide to Industries, 2010–2011 Edition, BUREAU OF LAB. 
STAT., http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs027.htm (last modified Dec. 17, 2009) (noting that tellers 
and other clerks in a bank usually only need a high school education), with MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH OCC. § 14-307 (LexisNexis 2009) (noting that to possess a medical license in Maryland, 
an individual must complete the requisite doctor of medicine degree from an accredited 
institution, one year of training in an accredited program, and an exam); BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 14-
305 (LexisNexis 2010) (stating that to acquire a professional engineering license, an individual 
must graduate from an accredited four-year university with an engineering degree, have four years 
of work experience demonstrating competency, and pass two eight-hour written examinations on 
fundamentals and principles and practice of engineering).  Banks may require financial managers, 
like the branch manager who allegedly met with Schultz and Holbrook at the Bank, Schultz, 413 
Md. at 23–24, 990 A.2d at 1083, to achieve higher levels of education, but a specialty license 
generally is not required.  See Financial Managers: Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2010–2011 
Edition, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos010.htm (last modified Dec. 17, 
2009) (considering branch managers to be financial managers and noting that most employers 
require financial managers to have bachelor’s degrees in finance, accounting, business 
administration, or economics, but not mentioning any required licenses or applicable statutory 
requirements). 
 190. Cf. Schultz, 413 Md. at 44, 990 A.2d at 1096 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
procedure at issue was a matter of “common sense”). 
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designing an airbag191 or deciding which kind of cement should be used to 
install a dental bridge,192 the average person likely has experience in adding 
a name to a bank account.193
With increasing parental assistance to finance children’s college 
educations,
   
194 increased cohabitation by couples before marriage,195 and 
greater longevity of the elderly,196 individuals in modern society are more 
likely to assist in the financial affairs of others.197
 
 191. See Wood, 134 Md. App. at 518, 760 A.2d at 319 (holding that defective airbag design 
was beyond the common knowledge of jurors). 
  With increased financial 
 192. Anderson v. Attar, 841 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (requiring expert 
testimony because “[j]urors are not competent from their own knowledge and experience to 
determine the appropriate kind of cement to be used to install a dental bridge”). 
 193. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 194–200.  But see Schultz, 413 Md. at 34–35, 990 A.2d 
at 1090 (expressing doubt that most people have added another person’s name to their bank 
accounts and stating that, even if they have, the average person has “not acted as a bank officer” in 
doing so (emphasis added)).  While the majority may be correct that most laypeople have not 
acted in the role of a bank official when adding another person’s name to their bank accounts, the 
transparent and obvious nature of the safeguards at issue, or lack thereof, dilute the force of this 
argument.  See infra Part IV.A.2.  
 194. See Catherine Rampell, How Americans Pay for College, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS: ECONOMIX 
(Aug. 23, 2010, 2:40 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/how-americans-pay-
for-college/ (noting that American parents on average paid for forty-seven percent of college 
expenses in 2010, up from forty-five percent in 2009). 
 195. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual 
Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 7 (2007) (noting that while only 500,000 households were 
reported as unmarried, opposite-sex cohabiters in 1960, the number rose almost 1000% to 4.9 
million in 2000). The 2000 Census reported 5.5 million unmarried-partner households, up from 
3.2 million such couples in 1990.  TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O’CONNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER 
HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, at 1 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-
5.pdf.  
 196. See JIAQUAN XU ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL VITAL 
STATISTICS REPORTS, DEATHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2007, at 2 (May 20, 2010), available at  
http://www.cdc.gov/NCHS/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_19.pdf (noting that the life expectancy in 
2007 was 77.9 years, thereby “continuing a long-term rising trend”). 
 197. The use of joint bank accounts, which a consumer can establish simply by adding another 
person’s name to his account, illustrates this trend.  See Kate Ashford, Do One Thing: Open a 
Joint Checking Account, BUNDLE (Oct. 14, 2010, 5:30 PM), http://money.bundle.com/article/do-
one-thing-open-joint-checking-account-time-30-mins-or-less (noting that a person can establish a 
joint bank account either by opening a new account or adding a co-owner to an existing account); 
Naming Names: Points to Consider Before Giving Friends or Relatives Access to Bank Accounts 
and Safe Deposit Boxes, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.: FDIC CONSUMER NEWS, 
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/news/cnfall05/namingNamesPG10.html (last updated 
Jan. 22, 2009) (noting that adding an individual to an already-existing account establishes a joint 
bank account); cf. Joint Versus Separate Accounts for Married Couples, LAWYERS.COM, 
http://banking-law.lawyers.com/consumer-banking/Joint-Versus-Separate-Accounts-for-Married-
Couples.html (last visited May 4, 2011) (noting that joint bank accounts are “the most common 
option for married couples”); Geoff Williams, Joint Bank Accounts: What You Need to Know, 
WALLETPOP (May 13, 2010, 1:30 PM), http://www.walletpop.com/2010/05/13/joint-bank-
accounts-what-you-need-to-know/ (noting that consumers may establish joint bank accounts with 
their spouses or partners, children, or elderly parents). 
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commingling, it is likely that many individuals have either added or 
removed a name on their bank accounts.198  Since courts do not require 
expert testimony on matters of which “the jurors would be aware by virtue 
of common knowledge,”199 the increasing familiarity of the public with 
such issues belies the Schultz court’s contention that the average layperson 
lacks such familiarity.200
2.  Expert Testimony Was Not Necessary in the Instant Case 
Because a Bank’s Procedure for Adding a Person to a Bank 
Account Is Transparent  
  Therefore, the court erred in determining that 
these procedures were too complex to fall within the common knowledge of 
a layperson. 
The Schultz court further erred in characterizing the addition of an 
individual’s name to a bank account as part of “internal bank procedures 
that the trier of fact cannot be expected to appreciate.”201  Noting that the 
relevant “unknown” procedures might take place behind closed doors, the 
court determined that these procedures were not within the ambit of a 
juror’s common knowledge because the average person had not acted as a 
bank officer in adding a name to a bank account.202  But unlike the 
selection of appropriate tools for a dental procedure203 or an international 
transaction or loan application decision,204
 
 198. For example, a couple who decides to live together or marry may, instead of opening a 
joint account, simply add each other’s names to their existing accounts.  Neal Litherland, How to 
Add a Spouse to a Bank Account, EHOW.COM, 
 the bank process at issue here is 
transparent.   
http://www.ehow.com/how_5901183_add-spouse-
bank-account.html (last visited May 4, 2011) (noting that many individuals simply add their 
spouse’s name to an existing account after marriage rather than opening a joint account); cf. 
Frequently Asked Questions: Student Accounts, BANK OF AM., 
http://www.bankofamerica.com/deposits/checksave/index.cfm?template=lc_faq_staccts (select 
“Maryland” as state from the drop-down menu) (last visited May 4, 2011) (suggesting parent-child 
joint accounts after a child leaves for college); Paula Span, A Better Bank Account, N.Y. TIMES 
BLOGS: THE NEW OLD AGE (Mar. 4, 2011, 9:09 AM), 
http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/a-better-bank-account/ (quoting Charles 
Sabatino, a lawyer who is a director of the ABA’s Commission on Law and Aging, that the joint 
bank account is “‘everybody’s default estate-planning tool because it’s widely-known and 
commonly used’”).  
 199. Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp., 134 Md. App. 512, 517, 760 A.2d 315, 318 (2000). 
 200. See supra note 193. 
 201. Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A., 413 Md. 15, 19, 990 A.2d 1078, 1080–81 (2010). 
 202. Id. at 34–35, 990 A.2d at 1090.  
 203. See, e.g., Anderson v. Attar, 841 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (requiring 
expert testimony because a dentist’s choice of which cement to use on a dental bridge did not fall 
within the realm of common knowledge). 
 204. See, e.g., Billman v. State of Md. Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 88 Md. App. 79, 113, 593 
A.2d 684, 700–01 (1991) (noting that the standard of care owed in the operation of a multi-million 
dollar financial institution is not within the common knowledge of jurors and is thus a proper 
subject for expert testimony). 
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The plaintiff in Schultz alleged that the Bank acted negligently in 
failing to follow its own guidelines by checking identifications and 
verifying the signature card.205  Such routine guidelines are open and 
obvious.  Unlike a transaction that involves computer calculations and other 
procedures that cannot possibly take place before the eyes of the customer, 
the bank employee adding a name to an account merely verifies 
identification in the presence of the customer.206
Even if the procedure at issue did involve internal guidelines and 
compliance with specific security requirements, the lack of such procedures 
is likely to be readily observable.
  
207  Just as allowing an individual to 
withdraw money from a bank account based solely on an oral attestation 
that he was the account-holder would constitute obvious negligence,208 
permitting one person to access the account of another without properly 
inspecting the required documentation for evidence of fraud or impropriety 
similarly displays an open and obvious failure to comply with necessary 
security procedures.209  For this reason, such procedures can be 
distinguished from more opaque processes, like the operation of a multi-
million dollar financial institution, which inevitably involves discussions, 
deliberations, and calculations of risk that the public would not easily 
recognize.210
B.  The Schultz Court’s Requirement of Expert Testimony in Routine 
Banking Transactions Improperly Burdens Prospective Plaintiffs 
and Fails to Maximize Efficiency or Prevent Future Loss 
  Therefore, due to the transparency of the actual decision at 
issue, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring the plaintiff to present expert 
testimony in order to demonstrate the Bank’s standard of care.   
By mandating expert testimony but failing to articulate a clear test for 
the common knowledge exception, the Court of Appeals improperly placed 
the burden of loss on prospective plaintiffs in cases involving routine 
 
 205. See Schultz, 413 Md. at 21, 24 & n.5, 990 A.2d at 1082–83 & n.5 (noting that Stephen 
emphasized these facts in his brief to the court). 
 206. See id. at 44, 990 A.2d at 1096 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (noting that the jury in Schultz 
“was not being called upon to evaluate security protocols for an international wire transfer or 
mechanisms for operating ‘sweep’ accounts,” but instead “was reviewing a commonplace 
transaction involving common sense procedures”).   
 207. Id. at 42, 990 A.2d at 1094 (“Although security mechanisms may be ‘internal procedures,’ 
the lack thereof may be visible and obvious.”). 
 208. Id., 990 A.2d at 1094–95. 
 209. See supra note 207; cf. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l) (2006) (noting that banks must reasonably 
comply with security procedures to verify the identity of any individual seeking to open an 
account). 
 210. See, e.g., Billman v. State of Md. Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 88 Md. App. 79, 113, 593 
A.2d 684, 700–01 (1991) (noting that matters concerning such operations are not within the 
experience of the average juror). 
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banking transactions.211  The resulting uncertainty regarding whether 
expert testimony is required in a particular case will likely result in an 
increased number of plaintiffs who must either bear the cost of paying for 
an expert or forego bringing suit.212  Because the bank remains in the best 
position to prevent the loss and develop innovative methods to avoid future 
losses, the Schultz court should have required the banking industry to bear 
the burden of loss for banking negligence and fraud in such routine 
transactions.213
1.  The Requirement of Expert Testimony in Schultz Improperly 
Places the Burden of Loss on the Plaintiff 
   
Cases like Schultz that do not clearly define when the common 
knowledge exception applies create uncertainty for plaintiffs, thereby 
improperly forcing them to bear the risk of loss for the bank’s negligence in 
routine transactions.214  By concluding that expert testimony is only 
required where the issue at hand is “beyond the ken of the average 
layman,”215 the Court of Appeals adhered to the vague, unclear standards 
that have traditionally defined the common knowledge exception.216  The 
Schultz court seemed to struggle with the bounds of the exception,217 
ultimately stating that since most people have not acted as a bank officer in 
adding a name to a bank account, the issue in Schultz fell outside of a 
juror’s common knowledge.218  In so doing, the court did not clearly define 
when the common knowledge exception applies—like so many cases in the 
past219
 
 211. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
—and left prospective litigants with the same uncertainty about 
 212. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 213. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 214. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 126–134 (discussing the lack of guidance often 
provided by courts when analyzing and applying the common knowledge exception). 
 215. Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A., 413 Md. 15, 28, 990 A.2d 1078, 1086 (2010) (quoting 
Bean v. Dep’t of Health, 406 Md. 419, 432, 959 A.2d 778, 786 (2008)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 216. Cf. King, supra note 126, at 54 (noting that reliance on similar “meaningless ‘tests’ . . . is 
perhaps tacit acknowledgment of the absence of meaningful guidance from the courts” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 217. Cf. Schultz, 413 Md. at 34, 990 A.2d at 1090 (expressing uncertainty about the frequency 
with which people add names to their bank accounts). 
 218. Id. at 34–35, 990 A.2d at 1090. 
 219. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 126–134 (discussing the lack of guidance often 
provided by courts when discussing the common knowledge exception). 
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applicability of the common knowledge exception in cases that do not fall 
at the two extremes of the common knowledge spectrum.220
By requiring expert testimony in this situation and placing the burden 
of loss on the plaintiff, the Schultz court permitted the expense of expert 
testimony to deter potential plaintiffs from bringing suit (except in cases 
with a substantial expected payoff value).
 
221  Since expert witnesses must 
be hired—often at high prices—for the opinions they will provide at 
trial,222 a requirement for such testimony imposes a heavy burden on the 
plaintiff.223
By requiring expert testimony without providing a clear standard for 
what constitutes “common knowledge,”
   
224 the Schultz court has forced 
prospective plaintiffs to play a high stakes game when deciding whether to 
hire an expert225: Either the plaintiff hires an expert and pays significant 
fees,226 or he does not hire one and risks having his case dismissed for 
failure to establish the applicable standard of care.227
 
 220. See generally King, supra note 
  In addition to this 
cost, the plaintiff will bear the loss caused by the bank’s alleged negligence 
126, at 52–54 (describing the “relatively straightforward” 
extremes of the common knowledge spectrum and the uncertainty resulting in the cases that fall 
between those extremes). 
 221. Cf. Mark E. Budnitz, The Consequences of Bulk in Our Banking Diet: Bulk Filing of 
Checks and the Bank’s Duty of Ordinary Care Under the 1990 Revision to the Uniform 
Commercial Code When It Honors Forged Checks, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 729, 753–54 (1990) (noting 
that rational bank customers, on whom the Uniform Commercial Code had placed the burden to 
litigate and which generally required expert testimony to make a prima facie case, would not 
litigate “unless a substantial amount of money [was] at stake”).   
 222. See Stephen D. Easton, Ammunition for the Shoot-Out with the Hired Gun’s Hired Gun: A 
Proposal for Full Expert Witness Disclosure, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 465, 475 (2000) (describing expert 
witnesses as the attorney’s “hired gun”); Hand, supra note 76, at 53 (noting that a serious 
objection to expert testimony arises because the expert “becomes a hired champion of one side”); 
cf. George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2000) (noting that while compensation for testimony is generally considered unethical, 
there is an exception for fees to expert witnesses).   
 223. See King, supra note 126, at 60 (noting that the expense of hiring an expert witness is an 
“onerous burden,” particularly when the chances of recovering on the merits may be limited). 
 224. See supra text accompanying notes 215–220. 
 225. Cf. Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d 495, 501 (N.J. 2001) (cautioning that 
while “plaintiffs may choose not to expend monies on an expert who will not testify at trial, there 
is some uncertainty in relying on common knowledge in professional malpractice cases” because 
plaintiffs run the risk of having their cases dismissed if the court determines that expert testimony 
is necessary). 
 226. See, e.g., Lisa Fields, 7 Factors That Affect Expert Witness Billing Rates: Get the Best 
Deal, ROUND TABLE GROUP: THE EXPERT ADVISOR (Aug. 15, 2007, 2:50 PM), 
http://www.roundtablegroup.com/expertadvisor/2007/08/expert-witness-billing-rate-factors.html 
(noting that the average expert retainer costs $4,000, and that some experts charge up to $1,000 
per hour).  
 227. See Lens, supra note 47, at 66 (stating that “if the plaintiff fails to produce expert 
testimony, dismissal is appropriate because the plaintiff has no other way to demonstrate the 
standard of care and breach thereof”). 
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if he does not win the case, even if he was not in the best position to prevent 
the loss.228  Balancing his options, a reasonable plaintiff, unfamiliar with 
the contours of the common knowledge exception, would likely conclude 
that he could not proceed without expert testimony.229  Aware of these 
higher fixed costs in litigation,230 fewer plaintiffs are likely to bring suit for 
alleged negligence.231  Instead, potential plaintiffs will bear the loss of 
alleged negligence individually rather than seeking redress through the tort 
system.232
2.  The Risk of Loss Should Be Placed on the Banking Industry 
Because It Is in the Best Position to Prevent Future Losses 
Through the Development of Innovative Technologies  
  
When banks are in the best position to take precautionary measures to 
avoid financial losses, such as when they act negligently toward an 
individual customer, banks should bear the risk of liability for that 
negligence.233  Further, if banks face liability for their own negligence, they 
will have a greater incentive to implement innovative precautionary 
measures to prevent future losses.234
 
 228. Cf. Budnitz, supra note 
  By burdening the plaintiff with higher 
litigation costs, the Schultz court effectively reduced a defendant bank’s 
221, at 745–46 (noting that where the customer is an individual 
customer, the bank is consistently in the best position to bear the loss); Julianna J. Zekan, 
Comparative Negligence Under the Code: Protecting Negligent Banks Against Negligent 
Customers, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 125, 148–49 (1992) (noting that banks are liable for paying out 
of a customer’s account without that customer’s authorization because “bank[s have] final control 
before executing the order of payment and can prevent loss by reviewing and confirming the 
customer’s order”). 
 229. See supra note 225. 
 230. Cf. Ralph Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, Learning to Crawl: The Use of Voluntary Caps 
on Damages in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 729 (2005) (noting that 
in medical malpractice litigation, required expert testimony contributes to high fixed costs and 
therefore expensive litigation).   
 231. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 111, 113 (1991) (noting that “because litigation is costly, not every victim will find 
it profitable to bring suit”).   
 232. Id.  As a result, the deterrence of negligent behavior is dependent on the probability of 
those victims who file suit ultimately winning their potential lawsuits.  Id. 
 233. See Budnitz, supra note 221, at 745–46 (noting that the law’s objective of preventing 
injury can be achieved by imposing liability on the party who can achieve such reductions at the 
lowest cost and concluding that banks are consistently in the best position to bear the loss when 
that loss involves an individual customer). 
 234. See infra text accompanying notes 240–256.  For example, similar to one scholar’s 
suggestion in 1990 that technologies such as static signature verification systems could make bank 
detection of forged signatures and fraudulent instruments easier, thereby strengthening bank 
safety, Budnitz, supra note 221, at 749, placing liability on banks here could incentivize them to 
implement similar technologies in the signature card, rather than the check, context.  Indeed, the 
imposition of liability on banks for paying on fraudulently endorsed checks contributed 
significantly to the safety of checks as a payment instrument.  Budnitz, supra note 221, at 732.   
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incentive to change its behavior to avoid the loss, such as through the 
development of innovative technology, thereby misaligning incentives and 
creating an inefficient result.  
Negligence is a measurement of reasonable conduct, and what is 
reasonable “is often a matter of costs of prevention compared with 
correlative risks of loss.”235  This principle suggests that the imposition of 
negligence liability is largely a balancing test.  The burden is appropriately 
on the plaintiff where the costs of prevention outweigh the costs of the 
loss.236  While a loss for an individual consumer can be catastrophic and 
represent a large percentage of overall wealth, banks and other large 
businesses can spread their loss among multiple consumers in the cost of 
services.237  For example, some banks now charge fees to open checking or 
savings accounts or impose higher existing fees, all of which they can use 
to cover expenses.238
Placing the burden on banks to prevent such losses becomes even 
more important when considering the difficulties in the current financial 
markets.  Identity theft is on the rise, with consumers falling prey to such 
attacks with increasing frequency.
   
239  If one presumes that some fraud is 
within the banks’ control240 and that it is appropriate to place liability for it 
on banks,241 then the proper incentives will exist for banks to take the 
precautionary measures to prevent future fraud.242
 
 235. Budnitz, supra note 
  In Schultz, assuming 
221, at 767 (quoting R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 
F.2d 291, 295 (1st Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 236. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.) 
(stating in algebraic terms that “if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; 
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL”). 
 237. See Budnitz, supra note 221, at 745–46 (“Ability to bear the risk depends on the relative 
size of the loss—whether it is small or large in proportion to the party’s total wealth, and whether 
that party can spread the loss by charging its customers a little more and still remain 
competitive.”). 
 238. See, e.g., Blake Ellis, Bank Fee Whac-a-Mole: New Charges Hit Accounts, 
CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 25, 2010, 2:06 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/24/pf/new_bank_fees/index.htm (noting that banks have found 
new ways to charge customers fees since the enactment of the Card Act, which banned a variety 
of bank fees). 
 239. See Hoofnagle, supra note 9, at 179 & tbl.6 (providing a table to compare the incidence of 
identity theft and other fraud events at major banks). 
 240. See id. at 156–57 (noting that for there to be a market for bank safety, “one must assume 
that at least some fraud is within the control of banks”); cf. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 374 F.3d 521, 526 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]he risk of . . . getting 
away with . . . fraud is reduced” if banks have a duty to confirm a transaction’s authorization).  
 241. See supra note 233; cf. Budnitz, supra note 221, at 755 (noting that assignment of liability 
for the purpose of realigning incentives involves a determination of which party is at fault for the 
conduct). 
 242. Cf. Budnitz, supra note 221 at 748–49 (noting that the loss reduction principle allocates 
liability in an attempt to incentivize the at-fault party to engage in technological innovation as a 
method of precaution). 
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that the facts as alleged by Stephen are true, Holbrook fraudulently added 
her name to Schultz’s account.243  Without the risk of liability in such 
circumstances, the Bank would have no incentive to guard against this type 
of loss,244 yet this situation is precisely the type that consumers trust banks 
to prevent.245
The current economic climate provides further compelling justification 
to place the burden of loss on banks, thereby establishing a market for bank 
safety. It is well established that banks are tasked with acting in the public 
interest when handling consumer transactions, including investments and 
mortgages.
   
246  The current financial crisis is a perfect example of the 
disastrous effects that lax bank standards and marginal accountability can 
have upon consumers.247  For example, it is unlikely that consumers 
receiving subprime mortgages from banks during the housing bubble would 
have approved of banks actively betting against their investments248 or of 
later cutting corners when processing their now-delinquent mortgages.249
 
 243. See Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A., 413 Md. 15, 21, 990 A.2d 1078, 1082 (2010) 
(noting that Stephen alleged that Holbrook forged Schultz’s signature to add her name to his 
account). 
  
 244. Cf. Budnitz, supra note 221, at 791 (noting that following one revision of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the Code placed liability on consumers for forged checks and provided no 
incentive for banks to take precautions or develop new technologies to detect forgeries).  Even the 
negative publicity that banks might receive in response to such a circumstance is insufficient to 
guard against loss because there is no alternative in the market for the banking industry.  Cf. 
Hoofnagle, supra note 9, at 160 (noting that even though “some institutions advertise that they are 
more resistant to fraud or that they fully recompense victims for losses,” they fail to “provide 
consumers with any objective means of distinguishing banks”).  Indeed, legal liability is the tool 
that would establish such a market—and the resulting incentives to change behavior.  Cf. Budnitz, 
supra note 221, at 732 (discussing a system of loss allocation in the context of check payment that 
contributed to making checks a safe payment method once banks began to face liability for 
payment on forged checks).   
 245. Cf. Bob Sullivan, Know Your Rights on Bank Account Fraud, MSNBC.COM (Aug. 12, 
2005, 2:56 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8915217/ns/technology_and_science-security/ 
(noting that individual customers frequently hope that banks will refund their losses following 
instances of consumer fraud, even if they believe that it is unlikely that the banks will ultimately 
provide these refunds). 
 246. See Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 307 Md. 527, 542–43, 515 A.2d 756, 763–64 
(1986) (noting that imposing a tort duty on the banking industry is consistent with the nature of a 
bank’s relation to public welfare). 
 247. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER 
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 156–57 (2011) (describing the relaxed banking 
regulations and resulting risky behavior by banks that led to the recent financial crisis). 
 248. Cf. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 79–81 (2010) 
(describing one Deutsche Bank trader’s experience “shorting” subprime mortgages in the credit 
default swap market in 2005); Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Past 
Subprime Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at A1 (noting that many borrowers were “cajoled or 
pushed into risky mortgages that they never had the ability to repay”).  
 249. Cf. David Segal, Debt Collectors Face a Hazard: Writer’s Cramp, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2010, at A1 (noting the frequent lack of review and verification when banks process delinquent 
mortgages). 
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Nonetheless, in recent times, banks have entrusted the credit and financial 
futures of their customers to employees who sign thousands of affidavits a 
day without apprising themselves of the relevant case details.250
If liability was appropriately placed on banks for such fraud and 
negligence in other routine transactions, the risk of loss would be placed on 
the party in the best position to create innovative technologies to prevent 
widespread loss in the future.
   
251  For example, like the automobile industry 
years ago, banks argue that they have no control over the risks consumers 
take.252  But, a market for automobile safety evolved even though 
automobile manufacturers could not control how consumers drove.253  
Banks, however, are unlikely to develop safety technologies on their 
own,254 particularly where the banking industry does not face liability for 
the absence of safety technologies because, quite simply, it is not worth the 
cost.255  In the long run, if the cost of investing in new technology is less 
than the cost of bearing liability, banks will choose the most cost-effective 
option.256
 
 250. Id. (noting that one employee of a debt-buying company claimed that she would sign as 
many as 2,000 debt-collection affidavits per day—an average of one affidavit every thirteen 
seconds). 
  Therefore, banks should bear the burden of the loss for 
negligence in routine transactions involving individual consumers, and the 
Schultz court erred in improperly placing this burden not on the defendant 
bank, but on the plaintiff.  
 251. See Budnitz, supra note 221, at 748–49 (noting that liability is often best placed on the 
party that is most likely to develop innovative methods of technology to prevent future losses).  
 252. Hoofnagle, supra note 9, at 157–58 (noting that several commentators have argued that 
consumers themselves may frequently be the cause of financial fraud when it occurs). 
 253. Id. at 158.  The establishment of a market for automobile safety refers to the shift in 
thinking that occurred among automakers—a shift from a driver error-based approach to a safety 
and design-based approach.  Id. at 159.  While automakers once viewed driver error as “an excuse 
to avoid safety and design interventions,” today they understand driver error “in more nuanced 
ways,” in the context of helping drivers avoid mistakes.  Id.  This safety-based focus has become 
so integral to the automobile industry that vehicle safety is a frequent brand-based marketing tool.  
See id. at 159–60 (noting that, for example, Volvo has tied its brand name to vehicle safety).   
 254. See id. at 160 (noting that a market for bank safety is not likely to emerge on its own). 
 255. Cf. Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer 
Payments, 66 TEX. L. REV. 63, 73 (1987) (“[F]inancial institutions often can reduce payment 
losses by taking the precautions that are presently available to them. . . .  [F]inancial institutions 
can reduce losses through internal measures similar to quality control in manufacturing.  
Precautions, however, entail costs in money, time, and effort, which discourage . . . financial 
institutions from undertaking them.). 
 256. See id. at 74–75 (“Recent technological innovations, such as automated check processing, 
have altered the cost of precaution and will continue to do so in the future.  The imposition of 
liability can create an incentive for the development of innovations that reduce both the cost of 
precaution and the frequency of losses.” (footnote omitted)). 
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C.  The Schultz Court Should Have More Clearly Defined the Common 
Knowledge Exception to Reduce Litigation Inefficiency and Realign 
Incentives 
If the Maryland Court of Appeals had developed a more definitive test 
for the application of the common knowledge exception in cases involving 
a bank’s standard of care in routine banking transactions, the court would 
not have reached an inefficient result.  Rather than relying on the vague and 
circular phrase “beyond the ken of the average layman” to define the 
common knowledge exception,257 the Schultz court should have instead 
applied a test similar to that proposed by Professor King.258  Professor 
King’s test, although initially developed for the field of medical 
malpractice, can be adapted to questions of bank negligence259 and is 
consistent with current Maryland law addressing the common knowledge 
exception.260  Using Professor King’s test as a model for determining when 
to require expert testimony in Maryland bank negligence cases would have 
avoided the burden placed on plaintiffs by the Schultz decision, leading to 
less expensive litigation and more efficient deterrence of future negligent 
bank behavior.261
1.  The Schultz Court Could Have Adapted Professor King’s 
Common Knowledge Test to Questions Involving Bank 
Negligence 
  
By adapting Professor King’s test for the common knowledge 
exception to the bank negligence context, the Court of Appeals could have 
provided prospective plaintiffs with additional guidance regarding 
situations requiring expert testimony.  Recognizing that “there is no 
guarantee that a court will apply the [common knowledge] exception to the 
particular facts in the case in question”262 and the resulting uncertainty,263
 
 257. Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A., 413 Md. 15, 28, 990 A.2d 1078, 1086 (2010) (quoting 
Bean v. Dep’t of Health, 406 Md. 419, 432, 959 A.2d 778, 786 (2008)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
Professor King proposed a test for the common knowledge exception in the 
context of medical malpractice that could easily be translated to the context 
 258. For a description of King’s test, see King, supra note 126, at 56–57. 
 259. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 260. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 261. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 262. King, supra note 126, at 67.   
 263. Id. at 76.  In fact, despite recognizing the common knowledge exception, some courts still 
recommend that counsel engage an expert as a precaution, emphasizing the uncertainty inherent in 
the common knowledge exception.  See, e.g., Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d 495, 
501 (N.J. 2001) (“Indeed, the wise course of action in all malpractice cases would be for plaintiffs 
to provide affidavits even when they do not intend to rely on expert testimony at trial.”) 
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of bank negligence.264  If applied to cases involving bank negligence, 
Professor King’s test could similarly permit use of the common knowledge 
exception where the alleged negligent act satisfies one of the following 
preconditions: (1) an unlicensed person can legally, competently, and 
foreseeably perform the act,265 or (2) the act does not involve a balancing 
of technical risks and benefits or the exercise of “uniquely professional” 
skills.266
While pursuant to Professor King’s original formulation, the presence 
of either precondition would permit the court to use the common knowledge 
exception,
   
267 the potential availability of the exception does little to resolve 
uncertainty in the banking context following Schultz.268  Indeed, a plaintiff 
in a banking negligence case may still be required to place his bets on the 
whims of a court if he does not put forth an expert269 because the Schultz 
court failed to clarify when the common knowledge exception does 
apply.270
2.  Professor King’s Adapted Test Is Consistent with Maryland Law 
Addressing the Common Knowledge Exception, and the Court 
of Appeals Could Have Applied That Exception Easily in 
Schultz 
  Therefore, in the banking context, King’s test should be adapted 
so that if a case satisfies either precondition, no expert testimony would be 
required to establish the standard of care.  If it had adapted Professor King’s 
test in this manner, the Schultz court could have developed a test for the 
common knowledge exception to provide guidance to plaintiffs in future 
bank negligence cases. 
The test developed above for applying the common knowledge 
exception in the context of bank negligence cases is generally consistent 
with existing Maryland case law.  For example, in Free State Bank & Trust 
 
 264. See supra text accompanying notes 135–153 (discussing Professor King’s test in detail).   
 265. See King, supra note 126, at 91 (defining this precondition in the context of medical 
malpractice).   
 266. Id.  
 267. Id. (“The fact that a plaintiff satisfies one of the preceding preconditions would not 
guarantee ipso facto that the court would apply the common knowledge exception.  Rather, it 
would merely make it permissible for the court to do so . . . .”).   
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 226–232 (discussing the “high stakes” game that the 
plaintiff risks in filing suit in bank negligence cases following Schultz).  Of course, courts should 
permit plaintiffs to advance expert witnesses where the testimony is helpful to the jury and the 
witness is otherwise qualified, but it is this author’s contention that the choice to introduce such 
testimony in the context at issue in Schultz should rest with the parties themselves.  See supra note 
72 and accompanying text (discussing the general admissibility of expert testimony where it will 
aid the jury). 
 269. Cf. King, supra note 126, at 91 (noting that the satisfaction of a precondition does not 
“guarantee ipso facto” the application of the common knowledge exception).  
 270. See supra text accompanying notes 215–220. 
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Co. v. Ellis, the Court of Special Appeals held that a bank’s improper 
release of a customer’s collateral on a loan fell within the common 
knowledge exception.271  Under the first precondition of the proposed test, 
a court would consider (1) whether a person must possess a license to 
perform the conduct at issue; and (2) if no license is needed, whether an 
unlicensed individual would be competently and foreseeably expected to 
perform such conduct.272  Even in the absence of a licensure 
requirement,273 a layperson probably would not be competently or 
foreseeably expected to be familiar with the largely opaque procedure 
related to securing a loan and releasing the related collateral.274
Nevertheless, the decision to release collateral would likely satisfy the 
second precondition, regarding the lack of balancing risks and benefits, as 
leaving a $200,000 loan unsecured
   
275 is notable precisely because the bank 
employee releasing the collateral presumably did not weigh the attendant 
risks and benefits.276  Rather, if the employee had considered the risks and 
benefits, he likely would have known of the impropriety of the attendant 
decision.277
The Court of Special Appeals’s decision in Saxon Mortgage Services, 
Inc. v. Harrison is also consistent with Professor King’s proposed common 
knowledge framework.  There, the Court of Special Appeals held that a 
plaintiff did not have to provide expert testimony to establish a bank’s 
negligence for accepting an instrument that was only partially endorsed.
  Accordingly, the adapted common knowledge test would not 
require the use of expert testimony in this case. 
278
 
 271. 45 Md. App. 159, 163, 411 A.2d 1090, 1092 (1980).  For a detailed explanation of Ellis, 
see supra notes 
  
114–116 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra text accompanying note 265. 
 273. See Banking: Career Guide to Industries, 2010–2011 Edition, supra note 189 (noting that 
many bank employees need not have a specialized degree or license to perform their jobs). 
 274. Cf. Robert A. Izard, Jr. & Kathleen M. Porter, Issues in Litigation: Proof of Relief from 
Stay, 2 J. BANK. L. & PRAC. 891, 902 (1993) (noting that where collateral is substituted, “whether 
the secured creditor is receiving the indubitable equivalent of its collateral should be based on 
expert testimony”). 
 275. Ellis, 45 Md. App. at 160–61, 411 A.2d at 1092. 
 276. See id. at 163, 411 A.2d at 1092 (“[B]anks do not ordinarily release the collateral of a 
customer and take in substitution thereof a paper writing which is not collateral, and which does 
no more than allow the bank to collect monies due on the collateral and credit it to the account of 
another.”).  The decision to release collateral, thereby leaving a $200,000 loan unsecured, is an 
action not undertaken in the ordinary course, and the lack of expertise, skill, and decision making 
is clear.  See id. at 164, 411 A.2d at 1093 (“[T]he average juror would know without expert 
testimony that banks simply do not ordinarily do what the . . . [b]ank did in this case.”).   
 277. Cf. King, supra note 126, at 95 (emphasizing that the common knowledge exception may 
be appropriate in cases in which the purportedly negligent action did not require any expertise or 
reasoned decision making). 
 278. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Harrison, 186 Md. App. 228, 290–91, 973 A.2d 841, 877–78 
(2009). 
44 Maryland Law Review Endnotes [Vol. 70:10 
Since licenses are not generally required in the banking context,279 the first 
precondition would focus on whether an unlicensed person would 
foreseeably and competently be expected to perform such an action.280  
Since it is unlikely that the average person has experience acting as a bank 
officer when paying on an instrument,281
The application of the common knowledge exception to Harrison, 
however, would likely be justified pursuant to the second precondition.  The 
alleged negligent decision involved the bank’s disregard of both its internal 
guidelines and express instructions written on the check itself.
 the first precondition would not 
be satisfied because the average person would not foreseeably be expected 
to act in this way. 
282  Because 
the bank’s disregard of existing internal bank procedures and the check’s 
instructions did not require the exercise of uniquely professional 
judgment,283
Had it applied this adapted test in Schultz, the Court of Appeals would 
have reached a different—and correct—result.  The alleged negligence in 
the case resulted from a bank employee improperly adding a name to an 
account by failing to properly examine identification.
 expert testimony would be unnecessary under the second 
precondition of Professor King’s adapted common knowledge test. 
284  Under the first 
precondition, the court would ask whether this conduct—the inspection of a 
signature card and other identification for the purpose of adding a name to a 
bank account—is conduct an unlicensed individual would be legally, 
competently, and foreseeably expected to do.285  Performance of this 
conduct likely does not require a license,286 but even so, it is unlikely that 
comparing and verifying signature cards and identification is something the 
average person would foreseeably be expected to do.287
Therefore, the second precondition of Professor King’s adapted test, 
which provides that the alleged negligent decision must not require the 
exercise of uniquely professional skills or the weighing of risks and 
benefits, would need to be satisfied to trigger the common knowledge 
  
 
 279. See supra note 189. 
 280. See supra text accompanying note 272. 
 281. Cf. Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A., 413 Md. 15, 34–35, 990 A.2d 1078, 1090 (2010) 
(“Even if most people have added a name to their bank accounts, most people have certainly not 
acted as a bank officer adding a name to a customer’s bank account.”). 
 282. Harrison, 186 Md. App. at 290, 973 A.2d at 878.  
 283. See id. at 290–91, 973 A.2d at 878 (noting that the disregard of the procedures was not 
“‘so particularly related to some science or profession’” as to require expert testimony (quoting 
Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp., 134 Md. App. 512, 518, 760 A.2d 315, 318 (2000))). 
 284. Schultz, 413 Md. at 43, 990 A.2d at 1095 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 285. See supra text accompanying note 240. 
 286. See supra note 189. 
 287. See supra note 281. 
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exception.288  It is unlikely that the decision regarding the quality of 
inspection of the signature card and other identification involved the unique 
exercise of professional skills.  Just as the complete release of collateral in 
Ellis was an infrequent occurrence, banks do not generally perform 
inadequate inspections of customer identification in the ordinary course of 
business.289  Similarly, like the disregard of security procedures in 
Harrison was obvious, so too was the Bank’s failure in Schultz.290  This 
case was thus not one requiring the exercise of professional judgment or 
unique skills.291
3.  Adoption of an Adapted Formulation of Professor King’s 
Common Knowledge Test Would Realign Bank Incentives and 
Lead to Greater Litigation Efficiency 
  Therefore, taking the facts alleged by Stephen to be true, 
Professor King’s adapted common knowledge test would not have required 
Stephen to provide expert testimony to establish the bank’s standard of 
care, and the Schultz court would have thereby reached the correct result. 
If the Schultz court had adapted Professor King’s common knowledge 
test to the banking context, the court would have properly aligned the 
incentives of the banking industry and created greater litigation 
efficiency.292  Since a test of clearer application and greater predictability 
would enable plaintiffs to anticipate litigation costs, it might also increase 
the number of suits filed.293  While increased litigation is not necessarily 
desirable,294 shifting the responsibility for consumer losses incurred due to 
bank negligence in routine transactions onto banks will provide prospective 
plaintiffs with increased litigation certainty and will create incentives for 
banks to invest in technology and other security procedures.295
 
 288. See supra text accompanying note 241. 
   
 289. Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l) (2006) (noting that banks must comply with procedural guidelines 
requiring them to check the identification of customers seeking to open new accounts). 
 290. See Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A., 413 Md. 15, 42, 990 A.2d 1078, 1094 (2010) 
(Adkins, J., dissenting) (reasoning that “the lack [of procedures in Schultz] may be visible and 
obvious”). 
 291. See id. at 44, 990 A.2d at 1096 (noting that the jury was “reviewing a commonplace 
transaction involving common sense procedures”). 
 292. For a discussion of the misaligned incentives in the banking industry as a result of Schultz, 
see supra Part IV.B.2. 
 293. Cf. Hylton, supra note 231, at 120–26 (discussing the impact of financial considerations 
on the incentive to bring suit and recognizing that “when litigation is costly, it is no longer 
obvious that plaintiffs bring suit only when suit is socially desirable”). 
 294. Cf. Casey L. Dwyer, An Empirical Examination of the Equal Protection Challenge to 
Contingency Fee Restrictions in Medical Malpractice Reform Statutes, 56 DUKE L.J. 611, 621 
(2006) (noting that medical malpractice reform is often proposed as a means to decrease rising 
health care costs caused by high litigation rates). 
 295. Cf. supra Part IV.B. 
46 Maryland Law Review Endnotes [Vol. 70:10 
With litigation rendered more affordable because it would not require 
expert testimony and the risk of case dismissal reduced as a result, it is 
likely that more individual plaintiffs harmed by bank negligence in routine 
transactions would be able to get their cases into court.296  Indeed, the 
attendant increase in liability that banks would face in this situation would 
create an incentive for them to ensure compliance with standard procedures 
like checking signature cards when major account changes are proposed.297  
Instead of providing a pen to their employees to sign off on thousands of 
foreclosure papers a day following little to no review,298 banks might be 
more willing to introduce and invest in safer, more appropriate procedures.  
Instead of allowing a person to add her name to a bank account without 
fully verifying the consent of the account-holder299 or permitting banks to 
make loans to individual customers who did not have the ability to repay 
them,300 banks, with their heightened burden, will have an incentive to 
enact safer procedures that more effectively protect the consumer.301  
Similar to the increased safety and prominence of checking as a result of 
placing the burden of loss on banks that pay forged checks,302 the increased 
risk of loss that banks will face in negligence cases involving routine 
transactions will properly motivate them to minimize such fraud, like the 
addition of a name to a customer’s account without proper authorization.303
 
 296. See Hylton, supra note 
  
While more protection for consumers in the form of statutes and regulations 
is undoubtedly necessary to fully motivate banks to create a real market for 
bank safety, establishing a more definitive common knowledge exception is 
a small step in the right direction. 
231, at 113 (noting that “because litigation is costly, the 
probability of winning a lawsuit becomes an important consideration in the decision to bring 
suit”).   
 297. See supra text accompanying notes 239–256.   
 298. Segal, supra note 249. 
 299. See Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A., 413 Md. 15, 21, 990 A.2d 1078, 1082 (2010) 
(noting Stephen’s claim that Holbrook fraudulently added her name to Schultz’s account). 
 300. See LEWIS, supra note 248, at 23–24 (noting that the banking industry frequently made 
loans to customers the banks knew could not repay them leading up to the most recent financial 
crisis). 
 301. See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 255, at 73–74 (“Legal rules that impose liability on 
consumers or financial institutions force them to include this potential liability in their calculus of 
costs, and thus weigh it against the cost of precaution.  In economic terms, the liable party 
internalizes the social value of the precaution.”). 
 302. Budnitz, supra note 221, at 732. 
 303. Cf. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 255, at 73–74 (noting that the risk of potential liability 
forces financial institutions to take such costs into consideration).   
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In Schultz v. Bank of America, N.A., the Maryland Court of Appeals 
held that a plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish the standard 
of care owed by a bank when adding a customer’s name to an account.304  
Characterizing the procedures at issue as internal and complex, the court 
determined that they did not fall within the common knowledge of the 
average person.305  In so holding, the court mischaracterized the procedures 
under existing Maryland law306 and failed to provide future plaintiffs with 
reliable guidance regarding the expert testimony requirement and the 
common knowledge exception, thereby improperly burdening the plaintiff 
and failing to maximize litigation efficiency.307  Had the court provided a 
more structured test for the common knowledge exception,308 the court 
would have better apprised prospective plaintiffs of their responsibilities at 
trial and provided an incentive for banks to adopt procedures and new 
technologies to prevent future negligence and fraud.309
 
 304. 413 Md. 15, 27, 990 A.2d 1078, 1085–86 (2010). 
 
 305. See id. (noting that the case “involved alleged negligence in regard to internal bank 
procedures that the trier of fact could not be expected to appreciate without the aid of expert 
testimony”). 
 306. See supra Part IV.A. 
 307. See supra Part IV.B. 
 308. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 309. See supra Part IV.C.2–3. 
